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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Reference is made throughout this Brief to the Transcript of 
the Hearing of April 7, 1983 (hereinafter "Transcript I"), and 
the Transcript of the Hearing of October 22, 1984 (hereinafter 
"Transcript 11"). 
1. Jeremiah Halloway (hereinafter "Jeremiah") was born on 
May 14, 1977 to Cecelia Saunders, an enrolled member of the 
Navajo Tribe domiciled on the Navajo reservation. Jeremiah is an 
enrolled member of the Navajo Tribe. Cecelia Saunders testified 
that Ernest Yazzie, Jr., an enrolled member of the Navajo Tribe, 
was the father of Jeremiah. (Transcript I p. 18). 
2. Cecelia provided primary care to Jeremiah during the 
first six months of his life. (Transcript I, p. 19). Cecelia 
then transferred care of Jeremiah to the maternal grandmother, 
Bessie Begay, who was the primary caretaker of Jeremiah until he 
was removed from the reservation. (Transcript I, p. 119). 
3. In March, 1980, Jeremiah was removed from the on-reser-
vation home of the maternal grandmother, Bessie Begay, by a 
maternal aunt, Polly Ann Dick. The grandmother was not present 
at the time of removal, and did not consent to the removal. The 
oral consent of the natural mother, Cecelia Saunders, was relayed 
to Polly Dick by another sister. (Transcript I, pp. 58-59, pp. 
67-68). 
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4. The Navajo Tribe was not informed of the removal of 
Jeremiah from the reservation. (Transcript I, p. 63. 
5. Jeremiah was placed by Polly Dick in the home of Dan and 
Patricia Carter for adoptive placement on March 23, 1980. Dan 
and Patricia Carter knew that Jeremiah was to be removed from the 
reservation for placement with them for approximately one month 
before the removal actually occurred. (Transcript I, p. 78). 
6. On May 30, 1980, Cecelia Saunders appeared in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court for Utah County and executed a Consent to 
Adoption. By minute entry, Judge David Sam ordered counsel for 
Dan and Patricia Carter to obtain the consent of the Navajo Tribe 
before permitting the adoption to proceed. See, Addendum 
Exhibits "D" & "E", pp. A-9, 10. 
7. On July 14, 1982, Judge David Sam ruled that the 
domicile of Jeremiah was that of Dan and Patricia Carter. The 
court stated: "This finding is based upon the fact that the 
child's residence appears to have been voluntarily and purposely 
removed from the natural mother, grandmother, and reservation to 
the petitioners." See, Addendum, Exhibit "E", p. A-10. 
8. On October 6, 1983, Judge David Sam entered additional 
findings on the issue of the domicile of Jeremiah: 
3. The Court finds that the relocation of the 
child with the petitioners was done with the 
intent to transfer to the Carters full parental 
rights as it relates to the child and with the 
further intent to abandon all parental rights in 
the child. 
-10-
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4, The Court finds further that the natural 
mother and family have abandoned the child and 
•that prior to the Court's awarding of temporary 
custody of the minor child to the petitioners on 
July 14, 1982, the petitioners stood in the 
position of loco parentis to Jeremiah Halloway. 
See, Addendum, Exhibit "F", A-12. 
9. On October 12, 1984, the District Court of the Navajo 
Nation for Window Rock found that, pursuant to Navajo common law 
and statute, the domicile of Jeremiah has at all times remained 
within the boundaries of the Navajo reservation, and that the 
Navajo Tribe has exclusive jurisdiction under tribal statutes and 
common law and the federal Indian Child Welfare Act to determine 
the custody of Jeremiah Halloway. See, Addendum, Exhibit "HM, p. 
A-25. 
SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT 
The State of Utah and the Fourth Judicial District Court 
were without jurisdiction under both the U.S. Constitution and 
the Indian Child Welfare Act to entertain a state adoption 
proceeding involving Jeremiah Halloway. The District Court had 
no jurisdiction to receive the consent to adoption executed by 
the natural mother. Remedial and rehabilitative services were 
not provided to the mother and were not necessary for her to 
provide adequate parenting of Jeremiah. The Order of the Navajo 
Nation was entitled to full faith and credit by the District 
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Court under the Indian Child Welfare Act and the Interstate 
Compact. --• 
AGRUMENT 
'•" • • • < 
POINT I. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS WITHOUT 
JURISDICTION TO RECEIVE THE CONSENT TO 
ADOPTION EXECUTED BY THE NATURAL MOTHER. 
In May, 1980, the Carters paid for Cecelia Saunders to 
travel to Utah to execute a consent to adoption. Cecelia orig-
inally consented on the reservation to the removal of Jeremiah 
for foster placement in March, 1980, and was informed approxi-
mately one month later by her sister, Polly Ann Dick, that Polly 
had placed Jeremiah for adoption. 
The consent to adoption was executed on May 30, 1980 in the 
district court. Cecelia Saunders was not advised to obtain 
independent legal counsel and consulted only with the Carters' 
attorney. Cecelia has testified that the Indian Child Welfare 
Act (25 U.S.C. §1901, et seq. , hereinafter ICWA) was not ex-
plained to her. (See, also, Reservation of Consent, April 30, 
1982). 
The ICWA confirms that Indian tribes have exclusive juris-
diction over any child custody proceeding involving an Indian 
child who resides or is domiciled within the reservation. 25 
U.S.C. §1903 (a) (iv). A voluntary consent "shall not be valid 
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unless executed in writing and recorded before a judge of a court 
of competent jurisdiction". 25 U.S.C. 51913(a). Jeremiah was 
clearly domiciled on the reservation at the time the consent to 
adoption was executed, even under the rulings of the district 
court in this case, since he had originally been removed only for 
temporary foster placement, only two months had passed (March 23, 
1980 to May 30, 1980), and no intent to terminate parental rights 
had been formalized. 
In such a situation the only "court of competent jurisdic-
tion" to receive Cecelia's consent was the tribal court, since 
the tribe had "jurisdiction exclusive as to any state" over any 
adoption proceeding involving Jeremiah while he was domiciled on 
the reservation. The consent to adoption executed by Cecelia in 
front of the district court was, therefore, not valid under the 
express terms of the ICWA since it was not executed before a 
"court of competent jurisdiction" and hence could not act to 
confer subject matter jurisdiction on the State over Jeremiah 
Halloway. 
POINT II, AN INDIVIDUAL ADULT INDIAN WHO IS 
DOMICILED ON AN INDIAN RESERVATION CANNOT 
WAIVE THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE TRIBE 
IN AN ADOPTION PROCEEDING. 
Cecelia Saunders at all relevant times during this proceed-
ing resided on and was domiciled within the Navajo reservation, 
Bessie Begay, the maternal grandmother of Jeremiah, also resided 
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and was domiciled exclusively within the boundaries of the Navajo 
reservations It is axiomatic that a child born out of wedlock 
takes the domicile of the mother with whom it lives and retains 
that domicile until a new one is lawfully acquired. Application 
of Morse, 7 Utah 2d 312, 324 P.2d 773, 775 (1958); Pestatement 
(Second) of Conflict of Laws §22, comment c (1971). It is, 
therefore, undisputed that Jeremiah was domiciled on the reserva-
tion at least until the consent to adoption was signed on May 30, 
1980, either by living with his mother, Id.., or with his grand-
mother as a blood relative under the in loco parentis doctrine. 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §22, comment i. 
The District Court ruled that the actions of Cecelia 
Saunders waived the exclusive jurisdiction of the Navajo tribe 
over Jeremiah by transferring his domicile, and thus tribal 
jurisdiction, to the State of Utah. This decision was based on 
Cecelia's consent to adoption, her alleged abandonment of 
Jeremiah and intent to transfer parental rights to the Carters. 
This ruling is incorrect because an individual cannot waive the 
exclusive jurisdiction of a tribe while remaining domiciled on 
the reservation. Utah Dept. of Bus. Peg., etc. v. Public Service 
Commission, 602 P. 2d 696, 699 (Utah 1979). 
This principle was enunciated in Fisher v. District Court, 
424 U.S. 382, 47 L.Ed.2d 106, 96 S.Ct. 943 (1976), where adult 
tribal members residing on a reservation attempted to invoke and 
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consent to the jurisdiction of a state court in an adoption 
proceedings involving an Indian child. The United States Supreme 
Court confirmed the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribe over the 
child, holding that such a ruling benefited the class of Indian 
people "by furthering the congressional policy of Indian self-
government." Fisher, 424 U.S. 390-391. The same principle 
applies when an attempted transfer of parental rights to 
non-Indians by a mother who resides on a reservation is involved, 
because the same principles of self-government are involved in 
that the tribe has a compelling interest in determining whether 
the placement of the child is in his or her best interests under 
tribal law or custom. 25 U.S.C. §1901(3). See, Williams v. Lee, 
358 U.S. 217, 3 L.Ed.2d 251, 79 S.Ct. 269 (1959); Wakefield v. 
Little Light, 347 A.2d 228, 237 (Md. App. 1975). 
Congress expressly confirmed this principle in the ICWA in 
the Act's exclusive jurisdiction section, 25 U.S.C. §1911 (a). In 
the legislative history to this section, Congress stated that the 
section confirmed the holdings of certain Indian child custody 
cases such as Wisconsin Band of Potowatomies v. Houston, 393 
F.Supp. 719 (D.W.D. Mich. 1973); Wakefield ,v. Little Light, 
supra; and H.R. REP. NO. 1386, 95th CONG., 2d SESS. 21, reprinted 
at 1978 U.S. CODE, CONG. & AD. NEWS 7530, 7544. These cases 
specifically held that an individual Indian cannot confer 
jurisdiction by consent on the state court because of the 
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significant tribal interest in "control over the custody of their 
children","^Wakefield v. Little Light, 347 A.2d at 237-38; 
Wisconsin Band of Potowatomies v, Houston 393 F.Supp. at 738, and 
both cases involved the custody of Indian children by non-Indian 
custodians. Nor may a tribe confer its jurisdiction on a state 
unless express federal law is followed. Wisconsin Band of 
Potowatomies v. Houston, 393 F.Supp. at 733; Kennerly v. District 
Court, 400 U.S. 423, 91 S.Ct. 480, 27 L.Ed.2d 507 (1971). It 
would certainly be anomalous if an Indian cannot confer 
jurisdiction in an Indian child custody proceeding by temporarily 
leaving the reservation and attempting to invoke state 
jurisdiction, yet can accomplish the same result by signing a 
piece of paper purporting to transfer parental rights to 
non-Indians off the reservation. Yet this is precisely the 
effect of the District Court's ruling. 
Two states have specifically addressed this issue under the 
ICWA (both encompassing portions of the Navajo reservation) and 
both have decided the issue exactly opposite to the ruling of the 
District Court in the present case. In Matter of Appeal in Pima 
County Juvenile Action No. S-903, 635 P.2d 187 (Ariz. App. 1981), 
cert, denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982), the mother (a minor) gave 
birth off-reservation, relinquished the child off-reservation for 
the purpose of adoption, and the child lived off-reservation with 
the prospective adoptive parents pursuant to a temporary custody 
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order. IdL at 191. Yet the Arizona Court of Appeals ruled that 
none of these actions were sufficient to divest the tribe of its 
exclusive jurisdiction since the child was still domiciled on the 
reservation. ^d. After noting that domicile of an infant born 
out of wedlock remains that of the mother until a new one is 
lawfully acquired (Citing, Application of Morse, 7 Utah 2d 312, 
324 P.2d 773 (1958)), the court ruled that a consent to adoption 
did not effect a legal change in the childfs domicile, Ld. The 
result of this ruling is that the mother could not confer juris-
diction on the state by her actions. 
The same result occurred in Matter of the Adoption of a Baby 
Child, 700 P.2d 198, No. 8190 (N.M. App., 1985). In that case 
the Indian mother, a resident of Laguna Pueblo in New Mexico, 
consented to the adoption of her child by non-Indian adoptive 
parents before the state court. The trial court ruled that the 
mother's actions shifted the domicile of the child to the 
adoptive parents, giving the state court jurisdiction over the 
adoption proceeding. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that 
"jurisdiction over the proceedings was exclusive in the tribal 
court. . ." Id. at 200. After noting that an illegitimate child 
takes the domicile of its mother, the court ruled that the 
actions of the mother did not confer jurisdiction on the state 
court. Id. at 201. 
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These decisions illustrate the error of the District Court's 
ruling in the present case. The principle that an individual may 
net confer jurisdiction on a court by consent is identical to the 
principle discussed in the previous section that domicile cannot 
be changed except by judicial decree. The court must first have 
jurisdiction before it can entertain a consent to transfer 
parental rights; to hold that the consent or transfer of physical 
custody gives the state court jurisdiction is an attempt to 
bootstrap jurisdiction which does not otherwise exist. 
The mother in this case, Cecelia Saunders, also could not 
confer jurisdiction on the state court in this proceeding because 
she did not have the legal authority under tribal custom to do 
so. The District Court's failure to recognize the social rela-
tions of Navajo people is an express violation of the ICWA, 25 
U.S.C. §1901(5); 25 U.S.C. §1903(6). 
The Navajo common law of adoption is set forth at Opinion of 
the Solicitor to the Courts of the Navajo Nation, Nc. 83-10 
(1983) (Attached as Addendum Exhibit "B", pp. A-2-7). This 
Opinion is entitled to full faith and credit by the State of Utah 
as a public record of the Navajo tribe. 25 U.S.C. §1911 (d). 
Navajo custom does not recognize the artificial legal 
relationships created by Anglo-European law wherein adoption 
results in the termination of the legal rights of the natural 
parents and the replacement of those rights in the adoptive 
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parents. Addendum pp. A-2f3. Instead, there is an obligation in 
family members to support and assist children which is not 
concerned with the termination of parental rights or the creation 
of a "legalistic" parent-child relationship. 
Similarly, Navajo custom does not agree with the Anglo-
European concept that the duties of child-rearing exist only in 
the nuclear family, and that parents of a child can terminate the 
legal rights of extended family members, such as grandparents, to 
visit with or obtain custody of a child. Under Navajo custom 
there is an "expectation that children are to be taken care of, 
and that obligation is not simply one of the child's parents." 
Addendum, p. A-4. Navajo custom "is not concerned with the 
termination of parental rights or creating a legalistic parent 
and child relationship because these concepts are irrelevant in a 
system which has obligations to children that extend beyond the 
parents." Addendum, p. A-6 (emphasis added). Under Navajo 
custom, a parent can no more consent to the termination of the 
rights of extended family members than she could consent to the 
termination of the parental rights of the father. 
The District Court in the present case has refused to 
recognize this concept, however. It ruled that the consent of 
the mother freed the child for adoption by the Carters. The 
maternal grandmother, the custodian of Jeremiah at the time he 
was removed, did not consent to his removal (Transcript I, at 
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127) and Cecelia's consent could not affect her legal right to 
custody of-Jeremiah under tribal custom. 25 U.S.C. §1903 (b). 
Cecelia could also not waive the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Navajo tribe to determine the grandmother's custodial rights 
pursuant to tribal law and custom, and therefore her consent 
could not waive the tribe's exclusive jurisdiction. The lack of 
understanding of the District Court in this area emphasizes the 
reasoning that custodial relationships under tribal custom are 
properly the exclusive province of the tribal court. 
POINT III, THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN 
IT FOUND THAT REMEDIAL AND REHABILITATIVE 
SERVICES HAD BEEN PROVIDED TO THE MOTHER 
AND PROVED UNSUCCESSFUL. 
The ICWA requires that "[a]ny party seeking to effect a 
...termination of parental rights to an Indian child under State 
law shall satisfy the court that active efforts have been made to 
provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to 
prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts 
have proved unsuccessful." 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d). In its order of 
January 28, 1985, the District Court found that "the burden of 
rehabilitation and working with the family has been met." 
Addendum, p. A-23. This finding was in error because the court 
did not apply the proper standard in determining whether such 
services had been provided. 
The legislative history of the ICWA makes clear that reme-
dial services must be designed to help the parents or Indian 
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custodians. The BIA Guidelines state that it must be demon-
strated tfiaft "efforts have been made to alleviate the need to 
remove the Indian child from his or her parents or Indian custo-
dians." BIA Guidelines, , 44 Fed. Reg. 67584, 67592 (§ D.2) 
(Emphasis added). The congressional history emphasizes that 
actual efforts must be made to help the parents of an Indian 
child before termination can occur. See House Feport, supra, at 
22. 
Two ICWA cases have addressed the issue of remedial ser-
vices. In Matter of Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action, 635 
P.2d at 193, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that section 
1912(d) required an "attempt to preserve the parent-child 
relationship" (emphasis added). See, Matter of Charles, 688 
P.2d. 1354 (Or. App. 1984), appeal pending, the Oregon Court of 
Appeals. The most disturbing findings of the District Court 
appear at page 3 of the court's opinion. Reference is made to 
hypothetical testimony of two representatives of the Navajo 
Division of Social Welfare that have nothing to do with removal 
and rehabilitative efforts. First, reference is made to Ella 
Shirley's general background testimony on the "shared care" 
concept in Navajo culture. The court dismissed this testimony by 
concluding that all the relatives were unsuitable to care for 
Jeremiah even though the most recent evidence was five years old. 
In addition, this testimony had nothing to do with the care which 
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could be given by the mother. Second, the Court quoted testimony 
by Ella SfTTrley in response to a hypothetical question that if 
Jeremiah could not be placed with the extended family, would she 
have thought about allowing adoption outside the Navajo tribe. 
Transcript I, p. 109. Ms. Shirley stated that she would place 
Jeremiah with another Navajo family. 
The District Court found that "[t]he social worker admits 
based upon those facts rehabilitation with the natural family 
would have been discontinued and the child would have been placed 
with another Navajo family." The conclusion made by the District 
Court based upon the testimony of the social worker, Lauren 
Bernally, is improper and has nothing to do with remedial 
efforts. Ms. Bernally was testifying on the critical interest 
the Navajo tribe has in its children, and stated only that even 
if in the extended family the natural mother could not care for 
Jeremiah, the interest of the tribe in retaining him in Navajo 
culture is such that they would have placed him in another Navajo 
home. Ms. Bernally1s testimony had nothing to do with actual 
efforts made to help the mother retain Jeremiah. Indeed, Ms. 
Bernally testified that no remedial or rehabilitative services 
were necessary because the mother had improved her situation on 
her own. Transcript I, p. 124. As stated before, the testimony 
of Dr. Samuel Roll, expert witness for the Navajo tribe, showed 
that Cecelia and Arthur Saunders were fit parents and that they 
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had no conditions which would be detrimental to Jeremiah. 
Transcriptr-fl, pp. 237-39. 
Finally, the District Court found that the tribe's social 
worker stated that the mother "vascilates Fsic] continually 
between wanting the child back and not wanting the child". The 
apparent implication of this finding is that the mother could not 
be worked with, but the Court presents no evidence or authority 
to prove that such vacillation was bad or improper. In fact, the 
testimony was unanimous, even from experts for the adoptive 
parents, that such vacillation is a common occurrence in a 
drawn-out adoption case and has nothing to do with the actual 
desire of the mother for custody of her child. Transcript I, p. 
126 (Lauren Bernally); Transcript II, pp. 197-198. (Dr. Howell); 
Transcript II, pp. 239-240 (Dr. Roll). The Court's finding on 
this point is, therefore, improper since it is either based on 
the personal opinion of the District Court judge or on authority 
to which the parties had no access, rather than from evidence 
presented to the court. As such, the finding is arbitrary and 
capricious and should be overturned. 
The remedial services section of the ICWA requires that the 
party seeking to effect a termination of parental rights must 
satisfy the court that they have made active efforts to help the 
family. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d). This applies to both public and 
private parties. House Feport, supra, at 22. The testimony is 
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undisputed that the adoptive parents in this case have had no 
contact atr-all with the natural mother, and that they made no 
attempts to see whether the mother could be assisted in resolving 
her personal difficulties rather than taking her child away. 
Transcript I, p. 43 (Cecelia Saunders), and p. 79 (Dan Carter). 
Basing the "failure of remedial and rehabilitative efforts" on 
the purported inadequacy of relatives and the alleged prior 
neglect of the mother, without any showing of the present need 
for services by the mother or that specific services were 
actually provided to the mother and failed, is violative of the 
constitutional right to raise a family. See, M. Hardin, FOSTER 
CHILDREN IN THE COURTS 255 (American Bar Ass'n. Nat'l. Legal 
Resources Center for Child Advocacy and Protection, 1983) (dili-
gent efforts to provide supportive services). The District Court 
committed error in finding that the burden of working with the 
family under the ICWA had been met. The decision of the District 
Court must be reversed. No remedial or rehabilitative services 
were ever provided to the mother, and the burden of proof in 25 
U.S.C. § 1912(d) has not been met. 
POINT IV, THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED 
ERROR BY DENYING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO 
THE ORDER OF THE NAVAJO TRIBAL COURT, 
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At the conclusion of the April 7, 1983 hearing, the adoptive 
parents stated that they could be ready for the subsequent 
termination hearing in 30 to 45 days. Transcript I, p. 171. The 
Court also evidenced its intent at that point to move the pro-
ceeding along. Id. at 171-172. Sixteen months later no steps 
had been taken by petitioners to fulfill their burden of showing 
that the parental rights of the natural mother should be ter-
minated, while the Indian child's emotional attachment to his 
non-Indian custodians was increasing. At this point the Navajo 
tribe decided to take action to invalidate the District Court's 
jurisdictional ruling rather than wait an indefinite period of 
time for the state proceeding to be completed. A tribal court 
action was filed in the Navajo District Court, Window Rock 
District, on August 8, 1984. In response to the tribal court 
proceeding, the adoptive parents requested an immediate trial 
setting on the termination hearing in state court, and did not 
appear in the tribal proceeding despite being personally served. 
The tribal court issued a decision on October 12, 1984, 
holding that the Navajo tribe had exclusive jurisdiction to 
decide the custody of Jeremiah Halloway and invalidating the Utah 
District Court proceeding pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare 
Act. Only five days later the tribe filed a Motion for Full 
Faith and Credit for its order in the Utah District Court pursu-
ant to the ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d). This motion was denied by 
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the District Court at the start of the October 22, 1984, hearing 
as being untimely. Transcript II, p. 3. This holding is not 
supported by case law and should be reversed. 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that a lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties, and a court 
cannot ignore lack of subject matter jurisdiction to reach the 
merits of a case that falls outside its legally-prescribed 
domain. Utah Dept. of Bus. Reg., Etc. v» Public Service Comm, 
supra, is such a case. [A]n objection to the court's exercis'e of 
jurisdiction may be made at any point during the proceedings." 
Utah Dept. of Bus. Peg., Etc., supra, at 698 (emphasis added). 
The Motion for Full Faith and Credit by the Navajo tribe was made 
before the close of the District Court proceedings. 
Case law is unanimous that subject matter jurisdiction may 
be raised at any point in a proceeding. Carlson v. Brown, 576 
P.2d. 1387 (Ariz. App. 1978); Triebelhorn v. Turzanski, 370 P.2d. 
757 (Idaho 1962); In re Adoption of Marsolf, 434 P.2d. 1010 (Kan. 
1967). An objection to subject matter jurisdiction can be made 
before or after a judgment has been rendered. Espinoza v. 
Southern Pac. Transportation Co., 624 P.2d 162 (Or. App), aff'd 
635 P.2d. 638 (Or. 1980). It can be raised even on appeal. 
Unruh v. Truck Inc. Exchange, 498 P.2d 1063 (Calif. 1972). No 
estoppel exists to asserting lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
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Application of Puget Sound Pilots Assn., 385 P.2d. 711 (Wash. 
1963) . 
The Interstate Compact on Placement of Children is specific 
Utah statutory authority which contradicts the District Court's 
ruling on the Full Faith and Credit Motion. UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 55-86-1. The Utah version of the ICPC includes Indian tribes 
within its definition of "Sending agency." Article II (2). The 
jurisdiction section of the ICPC states that: 
[T]he sending agency shall retain jurisdic-
tion over the child sufficient to determine all 
matters in relation to the custody... and 
disposition of the child which it would have had 
if the child had remained in the sending agency's 
state, until the child is adopted... Such 
jurisdiction shall also include the power to 
effect or cause the return of the child or its 
transfer to another location... 
Article V (emphasis added). It cannot be disputed that the 
Navajo tribal court order was issued before Jeremiah was adopted, 
and that the denial of full faith and credit on timeliness 
grounds is in direct contravention of Utah statutes, and should 
be reversed. 
POINT V, THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED ERROR 
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE STATE OF UTAH HAD JURIS-
DICTION UNDER THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT OVER 
THE ADOPTION PROCEEDING 
Jeremiah Halloway was removed from the Navajo reservation 
and placed in the home of the Carters in Utah on March 23, 1980. 
No judical proceedings accompanied the placement until May 29, 
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1980, when the mother was transported to Utah at the expense of 
the Carters for execution of a consent to adoption before the 
District Court. An adoption petition was filed by the Carters 
with the District Court on the same date. Various agencies of 
the Navajo tribe had been providing services to Jeremiah Halloway 
and his family on a voluntary basis from his birth to the time he 
was removed from the reservation. 
In April, 1982, after negotiations to return Jeremiah to the 
reservation on a voluntary basis had broken down, the Navajo 
tribe filed a Motion to Dismiss the Utah adoption proceeding 
based on a lack of jurisdiction. The District Court issued a 
ruling on the jurisdiction issue on July 14, 1982 holding: 
[T]he domicile of the minor child to be that of 
petitioners. This finding is based upon the fact 
that the child's residence appears to have been 
voluntarily and purposely removed from the 
natural mother, grandmother, and reservation to 
the petitioners, in view of that fact and the 
long period of time that the child has been with 
the petitioners, this court finds that apparent 
"good cause" exists for this court to take 
jurisdiction. . . . 
Addendum, p. A-10. 
The jurisdiction issue was reargued at the April 7, 1983 
hearing, at which time the District Court upheld its prior ruling 
that domicile had shifted to Utah, based on the transfer of the 
child to the Carters with the consent of some members of 
Jeremiah's family and the intent to transfer all parental rights 
to the Carters and abandon all parental rights in the child. The 
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court also ruled that the mother and family had abandoned the 
child and—that the Carters stood in loco parentis to Jeremiah. 
Addendum, pp. A-ll, 12. These findings were incorrect insofar as 
they held that the Navajo Nation had been divested of its 
exclusive jurisdiction over Jeremiah Halloway. 
Determination of the domicile of Jeremiah is critical in the 
present case because it is the linch pin of the jurisdictional 
controversy. Indian tribes, in the absence of express federal 
legislation, have always had exclusive jurisdiction to regulate 
their internal affairs and social relations free from state 
interference. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 
324, 76 L.Ed.2d 611, 619 (1983); Worcestor v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 
Pet.) 515, 8 L.Ed. 783, (1832). This authority includes juvenile 
matters, Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 602, 604; 60 L.Ed. 
1196; 35 S.Ct. 699 (1916); and domestic relations, Santa Clara 
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55-56, 56 L.Ed.2d 106, 98 S.Ct. 
1670 (1978). 
Tribal jurisdiction has a territorial component, too. 
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commyn, 411 U.S. 164, 36 L.Ed.2d 
129, 93 S.Ct. 1257 (1973); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 
U.S. 145, 36 L.Ed.2d 114, 93 S.Ct. 1267 (1973). The standard for 
determining whether a tribe has exclusive jurisdiction is whether 
the proceeding can be "appropriately characterized as litigation 
arising on an Indian reservation." Fisher v. District Court, 
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supra, 424 U.S. at 389. 'Emphasis added). If the standard is 
met, "the-jurisdiction of the Tribal Court is exclusive." Id. 
This rule applies whether or not all the parties are Indian. 
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223, 3 L.Ed.2d 251, 79 S.Ct. 269 
(1955) (Navajo reservation); Fisher District Court, supra, 424 
U.S. at 386. If there is a dispute over whether tribal 
jurisdiction is exclusive, such dispute should be resolved in 
tribal court. National Farmers Union Insurance Co. v. Crow 
Tribe, 53 USLW 4641 (June 3, 1985). "Procedural nightmare [s]" 
will be minimized if other courts stay their hand until the 
tribal court "has had a full opportunity to determine its own 
jurisdiction." Id. See, also, Fisher v. District Court, supra, 
424 U.S. at 388 (conflicting adjudications with state courts). 
For purposes of exclusive tribal jurisdiction over child 
custody matters, courts have equated "arising on a reservation" 
with the domicile of the Indian child. Wisconsin Band of 
Potowatomies v. Houston, 393 F.Supp. 719, 731 (D.W.D. Mich., 
1973); Matter of Adoption of Buehl, 555 P.2d 1334, 1341 (Wash. 
1976); Wakefield v. Little, Light, 347 A.2d 228, 238 (Md. App. 
1975); In re Matter of Greybull, 543 P.2d 1079 (Or. App. 1975). 
Congress specifically adopted the holdings of these cases when it 
confirmed exclusive tribal jurisdiction in the ICWA. House 
Report, supra, at 21. The exclusive jurisdiction section of the 
ICWA is set forth in 25 USC §1911 (a). 
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The ICWA does not contain a definition of the term 
"domicile.""^ The legislative history of the Act provides little 
illumination except for the fact that Congress intended to 
confirm the case lav/ of the Wisconsin Potowatonies, Wakefield v. 
Little Light, Ruehl and Greybull decisions cited above, and these 
cases interpreted the meaning of domicile when applied to a 
minor. There are well settled canons of statutory construction, 
however, which control the interpretation of terms in federal 
statues. See, Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U.S. 
103, 34 L.Ed. 2d 845, 103 S.Ct. 986 (1983). 
A substantial body of federal common law has been developed 
which interprets the meaning of domicile in federal statutes. 
The federal diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. §1332 (a), uses 
"citizenship11 to determine whether diversity exists, and all 
courts have equated citizenship with domicile. Gilbert v. David, 
235 U.S. 561, 59 L.Ed. 360, 35 S.Ct. 164 (1915); Stifel v. 
Hopkins, 477 F.2d 1116 (6th Cir., 1973); Sadat v. Mertes, 615 F. 
2d 1176 (7th Cir., 1980). No definition of citizenship appears 
in the federal diversity statute, and the courts have ruled that 
determination of the term is controlled by federal common law 
rather than the law of any state. Kantor v. Wellesley Galleries, 
704 F.2d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 1983); Sadat v. Mertes, supra, at 
1180; Stifel v. Hopkins, supra, at 1120. 
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One federal case specifically addressed the domicile of a 
minor chiW^-for purposes of the federal diversity statue, and the 
holding of the case has been adopted by all of the diversity 
cases cited above. In Ziady v. Curley, 396 F.2d 873 (4th Cir. 
1968), the court adopted the Restatement of the Laws of Conflicts 
(1934 ed., §38, domicile of a minor) as the federal common law 
for the domicile of a minor, Id. at 874, because the Restatement 
was consistent with the policies behind creation of the federal 
diversity statute. Id. at 875. As will be shown immediately 
below, the Restatement (now codified at Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws (1971 ed. , §22) is also consistent with the 
purposes of the ICWA of keeping Indian children with their 
families, deferring to tribal judgment on child custody matters, 
and placing Indian children in Indian homes. 25 U.S.C. §1902; 
BIA Guidelines, supra, 44 Fed. Reg. at 6785-86 (§ A., Policy). 
Such a result is consistent with canons of construction 
specifically developed by the U. S. Supreme Court to interpret 
federal statutes affecting Indians, namely that statutes passed 
for the benefit of Indians must be liberally construed in their 
favor, Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392, 48 L.Ed.2d 710, 
96 S.Ct. 2102 (1976), and ambiguous language in such statutes 
must be resolved in favor of the Indians. McClanahan v. Arizona 
State Tax Commission, supra, 411 U.S. at 174. The Restatement is 
a statement of existing laws, and, as the Bureau of Indian 
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Affairs noted at the time the ICWA was passed, there was no 
indicationr-that "these state law definitions tendfed] to 
undermine in any way the purposes of the Act." BIA Guidelines, 
supra, 44 Fed. Reg. at 6785 (Introduction). 
We now turn to the Restatement' s summary of the law of the 
domicile of a minor. All references are to the Restatement 
(Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971). The critical issue in the 
present case is the methods by which the domicile of a minor can 
be changed, and whether such a change occurred here. To 
characterize the laws in advance, change in the domicile of a 
minor where the parent does not change his or her domicile 
requires a court order, with one exception which does not apply 
in this case. 
Every person acquires a domicile of origin at birth, and 
this domicile continues until a new domicile is acquired. 
Restatement, §14(1); S14, comment a. "At birth an illegitimate 
child takes the domicile his mother has at the time as his 
domicile of origin (see §14)." Restatement, §22, comment c. The 
general rule is that the domicile of a minor child remains that 
of the mother. Application of Morse, 7 Utah 2d 312, 324 P. 2d 
773, 774 (1958); Matter of Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action 
No. S-903, 635 P.2d 187, (Ariz. App. 1981), cert, denied, 455 
U.S. 1007 (1982); Matter of Adoption of Baby Child, 700 P.2d 198 
(N.M. App. 1985) . 
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Comment c to section 22 of the Restatement states that an 
illegitimate child takes the domicile of the mother whether he 
lives with the mother or not, except as stated in Comments e-i. 
It is these comments which must be scrutinized to determine 
whether a change of domicile occurred in the present case. The 
rule stated in each relevant comment will be contrasted with the 
actual ruling of the District Court in the present case. 
Comment e addresses the domicile of an abandoned child and 
states that ". . . a child abandoned by both parents retains the 
domicile possessed by the parent who last abandoned him at the 
time of abandonment . . ." Abandonment is defined to include 
when the parent gives the custody of the child to another with 
the intention of relinquishing his parental rights and 
obligations. Since the natural mother's domicile in the present 
case has always been on the Navajo reservation, under this rule 
Jeremiah's domicile would also remain there even when he was 
abandoned. K.N, v. Cades, 432 A.2d 1010, 1014 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1981). Yet the District Court predicated its ruling on domicile 
on the abandonment by the mother and transfer of parental rights 
to the Carters. Addendum, p. A-10; Addendum, p. A-12. 
Comment g addresses the domicile of an adopted child, and 
states that an adopted child takes the domicile of the adoptive 
parent "at the moment of adoption." The only implication that 
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can be taken from this statement is that the domicile of a child 
who is being considered for adoption does not change before the 
decree of adoption is granted. This is especially true since 
adoption statutes are in derogation of the common law and must, 
therefore, be strictly and narrowly construed in favor of the 
rights of natural parents. 2 Am. Jur. 2d 865, 866 (Adoption, §§ 
6,7). This rule is also in accord with the domicile of an 
abandoned child discussed above in Comment e, where abandonment 
includes transfer of custody with the intent to relinquish 
parental rights. Domicile of the child remains with the parent 
until a judicial decree of adoption is completed. See, K.N, v. 
Cades , supra, at 432. In the present case the District Court 
bootstrapped its jurisdiction, holding that the domicile of 
Jeremiah shifted informally so as to give the court jurisdiction 
over the adoption proceeding itself. If the rule of Comment g is 
correct, the domicile of Jeremiah remained on the Navajo 
reservation, giving the Tribal Court exclusive jurisdiction over 
the adoption proceeding. 
Comment h addresses the power of a guardian to shift a 
child's domicile. The Carters have argued at various times in 
this proceeding that they became the guardians of Jeremiah when 
they obtained his physical custody, and that domicile of the ward 
is that of the guardian. See, Memorandum in Opposition to Motion 
to Dismiss, filed July 6, 1982, p. 2. Yet it is well settled 
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that a person can become a guardian of a minor child only 
"through judicial decree following compliance with the statuatory 
procedures." Matter of Adoption of T.M.M.. 608 P.2d 130, 133 
(Mont. 1980). Once again, a court order is required. The 
Restatement recognizes this principle by stating that the 
authority of a guardian must be ascertained from "the original 
decree of appointment or in some subsequent order". §22, Comment 
h. In any event, a guardian does not normally have the power to 
shift the domicile of a minor. Two of the cases cited by 
Congress as the basis for the exclusive jurisdiction section, 
Wakefield v. Little Light, supra, at 238, and Matter of Adoption 
of Buehl, 555 P. 2d at 1340-42, both rejected arguments of 
non-Indian guardians of Indian children that the domicile of the 
children had shifted off reservation with them. Both courts 
cited the federal policy of protecting tribal authority over 
essential tribal relations as one reason not to imply a 
guardian's authority to shift the domicile of the ward. 
The last comment of Section 22, Comment i, is the exception 
to the general rule that shifting the domicile of a minor child 
requires a judicial decree. Comment i addresses the doctrine of 
in loco parentis or the "natural guardian" theory. Where both 
parents of a child are dead or have abandoned a child and no 
court has appointed a guardian for the child, "the child should 
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acquire a domicile at the home of a grandparent or other person 
who stands'"in loco parentis to him and with whom he lives." 
The in loco parentis doctrine is limited to blood relatives, 
and no case has ever held that unrelated strangers can acquire 
such status so as to change the domicile of a child. In fact, 
the in loco parentis doctrine has traditionally been confined to 
grandparents, and has only recently been "liberalized" to include 
other close relatives such as aunts and uncles. See, Annot: 
Domicile of infant on death of both parents; doctrine of natural 
guardianship, 32 A.L.R.2d 863, 871. In the present case the 
District Court ruled that the domicile of Jeremiah shifted to the 
Carters because the Carters stood in loco parentis to him. 
Addendum, p. A-12. The Carters, however, are not related by 
blood to Jeremiah and all of the cases cited in their briefs, 
such as Montoya v. Collier 512 P.2d 684 (N.M. 1973), involved 
blood relatives. The District Court's reliance on the in loco 
parentis theory to hold that the domicile of Jeremiah shifted 
from the Navajo reservation to Utah without a court order is, 
therefore, in error. 
The time for determining the domicile of Jeremiah was when 
he first appeared before the District Court in 1980. The United 
States Supreme Court has ruled from the earliest days of the 
Republic that jurisdiction depends on the status of the parties 
at the commencement of a suit, and no subsequent change can give 
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or take it away. Connolly v. Taylor, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 556, 7 
L.Ed. 518-- (1829). This rule has been applied to the 
determination of domicile under the federal common law in 
diversity cases. Sadat v. Mertes, supra, 615 F.2d at 1180; 
Leavitt v. Scott, 338 F.2d 749 (10th Cir., 1964) (Utah). One of 
the cases cited by Congress as the basis for the exclusive 
jurisdiction section of the ICWA also adopted this rule. House 
Report, supra, at 21. In Wisconsin Band of Potowatomies, supra, 
the court addressed the question of when jurisdiction should be 
determined and concluded "that the only rational approach is to 
determine the domicile of the children at the time their physical 
custody was gained by the probate court." 393 F.Supp at 731. 
The District Court based its holding that the domicile of 
Jeremiah had shifted to Utah in the present case on the length of 
time he had resided in the state since the proceeding was 
initiated. Addendum, p. A-10. This holding is incorrect. 
The Utah Supreme Court decision in Application of Morse, 
supra, supports the principles discussed above. In that case, a 
mother domiciled in Utah consented to the adoption of her child, 
and the prospective adoptive parents removed the child from Utah. 
The mother then revoked her consent and asked for the child back. 
The adoptive parents argued that Utah was without jurisdiction 
because the child was now domiciled in Idaho. The Utah Supreme 
Court rejected this argument and held that the child remained 
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domiciled in Utah, despite the fact that the mother had 
"abandoned"*- the child and intended to transfer all of her 
parental rights. 324 P.2d at 775. The Court also held that the 
mother's consent violated Utah law and was, therefore, void and 
had no legal effect. This holding is analogous to the Navajo 
Nation's argument in the present case that the natural mother's 
consent violated the ICWA and was, therefore, void and 
ineffective as a legal attempt to abandon her parental rights and 
shift jurisdiction over Jeremiah to Utah. 
All of the ICWA cases that have addressed the domicile and 
exclusive jurisdiction issues have followed the principles 
discussed above and have been decided opposite to the holding of 
the District Court in the present case. Matter of Guardianship 
of D.L.L. & C.L.L., 291 N.W.2d 278, 281 (S.D. 1980); Matter of 
Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action No. S-903, supra (Ariz); 
Matter of Adoption of Baby Child, supra (N.M.). The Pima County 
and Baby Child cases are particularly important in the context of 
the present appeal because they involve states where portions of 
the Navajo reservation are located in addition to Utah. If the 
holding of the District Court on jurisdiction is upheld, the 
Navajo Nation will be confronted with conflicting interpretations 
of the ICWA on different parts of it's reservation, a result 
clearly at variance with the intent of the ICWA to establish 
uniform federal law involving Indian children. 
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The Pima County case is particularly illustrative because 
the natural mother in that case did not live on the reservation 
(in Montana), the child was born off-reservation in Nevada and 
placed in an adoptive home in Arizona. The Arizona Court of 
Appeals first held that the domicile of the infant followed that 
of the mother. Because the mother was also a minor, however, the 
Court ruled in addition that the domicile of the mother was that 
of her parents, on the reservation in Montana. Despite the fact 
that the mother had signed a consent to adoption, the adoptive 
parents had custody of the child pursuant to a temporary custody 
order, and the child had been out of the mother's custody for 
seven months, the Court of Appeals concluded that domicile 
remained with the natural mother because no court order had 
caused a "legal" change of domicile, 635 P.2d at 191. The 
decisions of the New Mexico and Arizona Courts of Appeal should 
be followed by the Utah Supreme Court in the present case. 
One unintended effect of the District Court's jurisdictional 
ruling must be raised. The court ruled that the parental rights 
of the mother could be transferred by her consent to adoption. 
Addendum, p. A-12. This holding is in violation of the principle 
that parental rights and responsibilites cannot be discarded at 
will by parents; they disappear only at death or at the moment of 
adoption when such responsibilities transfer to the adoptive 
parent. 59 Am.Jur. 2d 90-107 (Parent and Child, §§8-24, rights 
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of parents) • Utah has followed this principle in its case law, 
See, Gulley- v. Gulley, 570 P.2d 127, 129 (Utah, 1977) (duty to 
support cannot be relinquished by purporting to transfer duty by 
contract), and by statute, Utah Code Annotated §§78-45-4.2, 
78-42-2(5) (natural or adoptive parent has duty to support). 
The District Court's ruling, therefore, sets up a privileged 
class in violation of the equal protection clause of the U.S. 
Constitution. While the Carters acquired the benefit of a change 
of domicile for purposes of adopting Jeremiah, the natural mother 
was still responsible under Utah statute to support her child 
under the holding of Gulley. Either all responsibilities are 
transferred when the consent to adoption is signed and the Utah 
support statutes must fail, or all responsibilities transfer when 
a court order issues granting the adoption, in which case the 
District Court's jurisdictional ruling was incorrect. Control 
over domicile and the duty to support are both rights and 
responsibilities of parents; they cannot be split to deny the 
parent the benefits of parenthood while still saddling her with 
the burdens of such relationship. 
Finally, the State of Utah was without jurisdiction over 
Jeremiah because the Navajo Nation was already exerting 
jurisdiction on a voluntary basis at the time he was removed from 
the reservation. It is undisputed that several Navajo agencies 
were providing assistance to Jeremiah and his family from 1977 
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until he was removed. Transcript I, pp. 62, 119. The aunt who 
removed Jeremiah from the Navajo tribe, Polly Dick, testified 
that she concealed Jeremiah's removal because she disagreed with 
the tribe fs plans for him. Transcript I, p. 63. Polly had 
previously removed other Navajo children from the reservation to 
Utah in violation of Navajo law. Transcript I, p. 113. The ICWA 
requires state courts to decline jurisdiction where an Indian 
child has been removed and to return the child to the parent. 25 
U.S.C. §1920. The District Court erred in not following this 
requirement. 
POINT VI, THE DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
TERMINATING THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF CECELIA 
SAUNDERS WITHOUT A FINDING OF UNFITNESS 
WAS IN ERROR. 
In its order of January 28,1985, the District Court found 
"that the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that to 
return Jeremiah to his Indian custodians would result in serious 
emotional or physical damage to him." Addendum, p. A-24. 
Therefore, no finding was made en unfitness on the part of 
Cecelia Saunders. The District Court's termination order was 
based solely on the condition of Jeremiah Halloway and the 
emotional damage he would suffer if he was removed from the 
Carters. 3jd., p. A-16. 
The finding of the District Court confused the two separate 
stages of a termination proceeding: the fact-finding stage where 
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the parents must be found unfit, and the dispositional stage 
where the~~^best interests of the child can be considered 
independent of parental interest. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 
745, 71 L.Ed.2d 599, 611, 102 S.Ct. 1388 (1982). See, also, In 
re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1368-69 (Utah 1982). By holding only 
that the best interests of Jeremiah required termination because 
he was so bonded to present custodians the District Court 
violated the requirements of the United States Constitution, and 
the Indian Child Welfare Act. 
The right of parents to sustain a relationship with their 
children is protected by the Constitution. In re J.P., 648 P.2d 
1364, 1372-74, 1377 (Utah 1982). 
"The rights of adoptive parents are not, however, enveloped 
in the same degree of due process protection which attaches to 
the divestiture of parental custody." Guardianship of Baby Boy 
M, 135 Cal. Rptr. 866, 873 (Cal. App. 1977). It is well settled 
that termination of parental rights would offend the Due Process 
Clause if the breakup of a family is forced without some showing 
of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to 
be in the children's best interest. Santosky v. Kramer, supra, 
71 L.Ed.2d at 611; Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); 
Smith v.. Organization of Foster Familes, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 
(1977); In re J.P., supra, 648 P.2d at 1374, 1377. The natural 
mother in the present case was never informed of the specific 
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conditions that led to her "unfitness" so that she could have a 
chance to -take appropriate remedial action. Failure to so inform 
the mother is a denial of due process. State v. Lance, 23 Utah 
2d 407, 464 P.2d 395, 399 (1970). 
The Utah Supreme Court has established a clear standard that 
a court may not terminate the rights of a parent solely in the 
best interests of the child. In re J.P. , supra, at 1368, 1374. 
The best interests standard is applicable only to a custody 
dispute between parents, Interest of Walter B., 577 P.2d 119, 125 
(Utah, 1978); for termination the parents must be found unfit. 
J.P., supra, at 1374. 
Several Utah decisions have addressed the holding of the 
District Court in the present case that parental rights can be 
terminated solely on the child's attachment to his present 
caretakers rather than through any fault of the parents, and have 
rejected such reasoning. In State, In Interest of E. v. J.T., 
578 P.2d 831 (Utah 1978), the juvenile court based its 
termination of parental rights order in part on the finding that 
the children regarded their foster parents as their psychological 
parents and had had no contact with the mother for over two and 
one-half years." Id. at 834. The Supreme Court rejected this 
reasoning, Id. at 836, and reversed the termination order. See, 
also, Interest of Walter B., 577 P.2d 119 (Utah 1978); and 
Commonwealth ex rel. Grimes v. Yack, 433 A.2d 1363, 1380-82 (Pa. 
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Super. Ct. 1981) (extensive discussion of the distinction between 
medical and^-legal models). 
The District Court made no finding of unfitness on the part 
of the mother. Indeed, the testimony was undisputed that Cecelia 
Saunders and her husband, Arthur, were fit parents. Transcript 
II, pp. 237-239; Letter from Dr. Mueller, Addendum, p. A-l. 
This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that termination 
of parental rights must be based on present conduct, and all of 
the evidence of parental conduct offered by the Carters and 
considered by the District Court, including the issue of 
abandonment, was several years old. In Interest of Winger, 558 
P.2d 1311 (Utah 1976), the Utah Supreme Court, after noting that 
Oregon's termination statute is "identical" to Utah's, Id. at 
1313, adopted the holding of the Oregon Court of Appeals in State 
v. Blum, 463 P.2d 367, 371 (Or.App. 1970), that the evidence must 
prove "that the parent is presently unable to supply physical and 
emotional care for the child . . ." 558 P. 2d at 1313-14. 
(emphasis added). See, State ex rel. Juvenile Dept. v. Chapin 
675 P.2d 1117, 1118 (Or.App. 1984). This requirement of 
"present" conduct has been followed in all other Utah termination 
cases. In re J.P., supra, 648 P.2d at 1377 (parent must be shown 
to be "unfit, abandoning, or substantially neglectful"); Interest 
of Walter B., supra, 577 P.2d at 124 (quoting State v. Lance, 464 
P.2d 395 (Utah 1970), on "the alleged inadequacies of the 
-45-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
environment she was providing"); In re Castillo, 632 P.2d 855, 
857 (Utah "1981) (prospect of beneficial parenting). See, also, 
In re Adoption of Michael J.C., 473 A.2d 1021, 1027 (Pa." Super. 
1984). 
In State, In Interest of E. v. J.T., supra, the mother also 
placed her children from a former marriage voluntarily in 
substitute care because of problems with her present husband. 
5 78 P. 2d at 832. The Utah Supreme Court reversed an order 
terminating the parental rights of the mother despite the 
position of the state that the mother had taken no action to 
solve her problems, Id. at 835, finding the mother was attempting 
to address the problems which had led to the initial placement. 
Id. In the present case, the mother has also taken care of the 
problems that led to the initial placement, and as the Utah 
Supreme Court noted in State v. Lance, supra, there is not " . . . 
a scintilla of evidence that the home itself cannot or will not 
correct the evils which exist." 464 P. 2d at 399. Where the 
incidents which are the basis of the trial court's opinion 
occurred several years before the hearing and no evidence was 
presented to show that the mother's present conduct would 
adversely affect the child, " . . . past misconduct is not 
controlling where a parent is presently fit." In re Adoption of 
Michael J.C., supra, 473 A.2d at 1C27. 
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I 
The District Court also found abandonment because the mother 
knew where"^the Carters lived, but made no attempt to contact 
them. Addendum, p. A-24. However, the Carters testified that 
they were advised to prohibit visitation (Transcript I, p. 80) 
and the Carters1 attorney told the mother that she could not 
contact the child (Transcript I, p. 44). Indian people have a 
well established trait of "non-interference" in the affairs of 
others, particularly where confronted with non-Indian authority 
figures. See, e.g. J. Good Tracks, "Native American 
non-interference", 18 Social Work 30 (1973). Once she was told 
that she could not contact her child, she believed she had no 
option and her failure to visit does not reflect a lack of 
desire, but rather a lack of understanding. 
The ICWA adopted the constitutional "fitness" standard but 
imposed an additional level of proof which can "rarely" be met. 
Santosky v. Kramer, supra, 455 U.S. at 768-69. The ICWA requires 
a ". . . determination, supported by evidence beyond a reasonable 
doubt, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that 
the continued custody of the child by the parent. . . is likely 
to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child." 
25 U.S.C. §1912(f). The Act requires conduct on the part of the 
parent which will be seriously detrimental to the child, a 
finding of unfitness. BIA Guidelines, 44 Fed. Reg. at 67593 
(§§D.3(c); D.4). In fact, termination cannot be ordered "simply 
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based on a determination on that the parents or custodians are 
'unfit parents1. It must be shown that it is dangerous for the 
child to remain with his or her present custodians." BIA 
Guidelines, 44 Fed. Reg. at 67593 (§D.3. Commentary). Every 
reported ICWA case addressing termination of parental rights has 
required a finding that the parent's conduct toward the child 
would be so detrimental as to cause the child serious emotional 
or physical harm. See, e.g., Matter of Appeal in Pima County 
Juvenile Action No. S-903, supra, 635 P.2d at 193; In re Fisher, 
643 P.2d 887 (Wash. App. 1982), In the Matter of J.L.H., 316 
N.W.2d 650 (S.D. 1982). 
The Carters successfully argued to the District Court that 
termination of parental rights was justified under the ICWA 
because continued custody of Jeremiah by Ceclia would result in 
emotional damage to him, not through any conduct on the part of 
the mother, but only because her actions in asserting parental 
rights would cause him damage because he would suffer harm by 
being removed from the custody of the Carters. This is the same 
best interests test rejected by both the U.S. and Utah Supreme 
Courts. It is well settled that Congress must follow 
constitutional structures in its dealings with Indians. F. 
Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 217-220 (1982 ed.), and so 
Congress could not possibly have imposed a standard on Indians 
which has been found to be unconstitutional. It also makes no 
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sense to permit an easier "best interests" or "condition of the 
child" termination test under the ICWA when the stated purpose of 
the ICWA was to make termination more difficult. See, 25 U.S.C. 
§1921. 
The District Court ruled in essence that the Navajo 
reservation was an improper place for Jeremiah to grow upf and 
that his Navajo environment would cause him severe emotional or 
physical damage. The Utah Supreme Court rejected such a standard 
In re J.P., supra, 648 P.2d at 1376 where it held that cultural 
diversity is entitled to constitutional protection. The ICWA 
also specifically prohibits termination based on community 
conditions. BIA Guidelines, supra, 44 Fed. Reg. at 67592-93 
(SD.3. (c)). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the decree of adoption issued by 
the District Court in the present proceeding should be declared 
void, and the custody of Jeremiah Halloway returned to his 
natural mother, Cecelia Saunders. 
Submitted this ^ ~ ^ day of July, 1985. 
7f\Ui^~-
Mary' Ellen Sloan 
Craig Dorsay 
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OPINION OF THE SOLICITOR TO THE 
COURTS OF THE NAVAJO NATION 
No. 83-10 
QUESTION: What is the Navajo Com.non Law of adoption? 
• 
This opinion is prepared for the Honorable William Leupp, former 
judge of the Courts of the Navajo Nation, at the instruction of Chief Justice 
Nelson J. McCsbe. 
There are some very important distinctions and differences in approaching 
the Navajo Common Law of adoption because it is quite different from the Anglo-
European law of adoption. 
First of all, Anglo-European adoption focuses upon artificial legal 
relationships: 
"Adoption is the legal process by"which a child 
acquires parents other than his natural parents and 
parents acquire a child other than a natural child. 
As a result of the adoption decree the legal rights 
and obligations which formerly existed between the 
child and his natural parents come to a"n end, and 
are replaced by similar rights and obligations with 
respect to his new adoptive parents." Clark, The Law 
of Domestic Relations in the United States, Sec. 18.1, 
p. 602 (1968). 
In other words, the law makes a substitution of parents for a child and terminates 
the parent and child bond with the natural parents (at least legally-speaking). 
The adoption process requires the termination of the legal bond with natural ; 
parents because of the idea that there can only be one parent and child relu*#on-
ship at any one time. JW. ftr}?. 
Another important point about Anglo-European adoption law is that it is 
a law which is created only by statute, and it did not come to the United States 
courts through the English Common (or customary) Law. Ic|. at p. 603. As a result," 
the current American law of adaption is recent and a product of modern American 
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attitudes. There has alno been a history of hostility toward the law of 
f 
adoption in American courts, possibly due to the fact thatitwas not created v 
over a long period of time by the courts to fit the needs of those who have 
come before them. I_d. 
The American law of adoption thinks in terms of duties. Natural 
parents have duties toward their children, and when those duties are breached, 
then the law will take the children away from the natural parents and "give" 
them to other parents. Navajo concepts are different, and the following 
description has been made of Navajo legal attitudes toward family relationships: 
"Navajo believe that each person has the right to speak 
for oneself and to act as one pleases. The mutual rights and 
duties of kinsmen normally discussed under the concept of jural 
relations are best described as mutual expectations, rather.than 
obligations. This distinction is a matter of emphasis and decree, 
but it is yery real and worth noting. Desirable actions on the 
part of others are hoped for and even expected, but they are not 
required or demanded. Coercion is always deplored." Witherspobn, 
Navajo Kinship and Marriage, pp. 94-95 (1975). /' 
Therefore the Navajo view of the relation of children to parents is not one of a 
simple parent and child relationship, but an entire pattern of expectations and 
desirable actions surrounding children. 
The central concept of child rearing in Navajo society should be grasped 
before there is any discussion of the Navajo Common Law of adoption. One descrip-
tion of that concept is: .'•'',,• :•.*:•',v ..:-h-:U "•< 
. - : . ', '.'••"."•••'••'"'i -* • :-"'; ^<l"~-- »."-
. . . . ; . •• • . • • • f-- .• •; .fV-Vr ' " 
"The Navajo people identify themselves as 'Dine,1; which means ^ 
'The People.' The term v, simply an expression of native pride .or*;:^ 
a message that conveys m~:iy things which are central in native T" ; '.'"-?: 
feelings. One of the m o t important societal values included in 
this central native feeling is the attitude toward children. They 
_.. are hiohly valued and wanted. The basis .for. .this Navajo life _ _ . _ _ „ _ 
T ^ t ^ nal parents o€ the^f inst^ 
j-..-£il^ v^ H-^  Pn a°y creature o r ^ b k ^ ^ y ^ ^ s t r ^ ^ d ^ ^ e s ^ 
^JN^^r'-':>:;i^-' f irst child". i-Thi^  "act or behavior woultf- devafiie: d'r^ 
supernaturals with whom the first human baby was identified. * 
Therefore, in the Navajo religious context inhumane cruelty to 
children was prohibited." "Navajo Child Rearing Concepts," Child£ ^ 
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Abuse and Neglect - A Navajo Perspective (Navajo Childrens' Legal 
Services, draft section of .a manual* for use in child welfare ser-
vices, 1983). 
The legal sanctions underlying the basic value of the child are spiritual, and 
they in turn create restrictions on behavior as well as set down obligations 
which are cultural and a part of the everyday "folk law" of the Navajo.. Navajo 
Common Law is frequently expressed in terms of sacred instructional stories and 
symbols, and the place of the child in Navajo society is expressed in this way: 
"The special social position of an infant is illustrated 
further by the symbolic significance of the manner in which the 
cradle board was constructed and assembled for the first infant. 
The mythological belief of the Navajo was th?t the first female 
infant was conceived through the union of the goddess Earth anci 
the Heavens. *A significant other,1 a member of some centaur 
generation often referred to as 'the first people,' heard an 
echo of a baby cry and after a long search found an infant on a 
cliff of a mesa. The discoverer then immediately designed the 
first <:>adle board with a certain 'omnipotent being1 giving her 
instrt/ ions. 
The main boards of the cradle were given by the earth which ' 
represented the soul and mind. The headboard was made fn 1 the 
rainbow which stood for .abiding presence of peace ar.d beauty. 
The footrests were made of sunbeams, and the lacings were zig-zag 
lightening which represented power. Finally, the protective 
coverings held in place by the arch represented the black clouds 
or the Universe. In this sphere of protection and security of the 
cradle board, the first infant was to be reared. Therefore, each 
part of the cradle board had a symbolic and an important meaning. 
The cradle board nurturing process is therefore considered by 
Navajo as a religous ritual. Significant also is the belief that 
• the acceptance of the first infant by the 'first people' was the 
ancient Navajo concept of adoption." I£. 
s. ."•... 
Therefore we have the Navajo Common Law principles of the expectation that children. 
are to be taken care of, and that obligation is not simply one of the rhild's , ^ 
. w v g ^ **-
parents. The Navajo have very strong family and clan ties, and Dan Vicenti, a 
noted commentator on Navajo Common Law, said this regarding the care of children 
of broken homes: -_' rV ' ,j... ..•.,:: -..., .'..; 
• ' . • • • 
"In the old days, and even among some of the present Navajo 
families where the kinship ties are still very strong, the matter 
of child support is not of paramount concern to relatives of couples 
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r € that break apart or get a divorce, because, from the time a child is small, he or she is treated as a son or daughter. The child identifies with his maternal aunts or, in a lo*. of 
cases, paternal aunts, as being mothers; and the term aunt 
is (translated as) little mother. And if the real mother is 
away for any reason at the hospital or sorr^place, they're 
just taken in by the maternal aunts or paternal aunts, who are 
already treating them as being their own, a member of their own 
nuclear family, so that particular system took care of the 
matter of child support. That is the reason why, it seems to 
me, that child support or paternity suits and things like that 
were never a Navajo practice, or of real concern to mothers 
before, as they seem to be now." Vicenti, Jirnson, Conn and 
Kellogg, II The law of the People - Dine* Bibee Haz'aanii, 
p. 230 (1972^ — 
The term "adoption" is used by Navajo commentators on Navajo Common 
Law, but it is used in a different sense than that used in Anglo-European 
adoption statutes: 
"Orphans of Navajo families, or children of large families 'or 
broken homes are adopted by other family members or a family 
member of the same clan as the child." Carl N. Gorman, "The 
Navajo Nation is Made up of Many Clans," (Address to the Navajo 
Childrens* Conference, 1980); Published in Dine1 Center for , 
Human Development, For Generations to Come. . . (1932), v 
Navajo adoption has a different focus than Anglo-European law, i.e. it is not 
principally concerned with the exchange of "legal" parents: 
"Nav:jo adoption is based on need, mutual help and love. •' 
Children may or may not change the surname. Either way the 
family is a unit with strong, supportive, extended family and 
clan ties. It has worked for hundreds of years without adop-
tion agencies and courts of law." IdL .. . •> 
• >• u ' - : \ . : . : . « . ' ,•'•.•'• yy':&r^i 
Another distinctive aspect of Navajo adoption Ms that i t is not necesiafyl 
permanent: • 'V&-*}g&t& 
••'•'
 :
- ' < % : ; T $ 
"Adoption is merely a case of taking the child into the home for.'; ;-
a limited time, or permanently, by extending family or parental '""•' 
*2_-. -• - v-agreements-depending on thft-ci.rcumstaoces^..J.hjs^hJ14J^.iri»is.eji^jtl 
. ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ a n i d ? treated Itsronfr! s; "own;'.- ^ Grandparents^Jar^.^c^tlnss-.ttTernine^^^ 
/~£.:-r:v*r*- —--..., v ;-y,e1f"own deceased or unwed children, or other related[family••^rry* 
members." |d_. 
In Navajo Common Law a child is said to be "born for", his father's clan 
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and a "member" of his mother's clan. This means that a child is an integral 
part of a functioning, self-reinforcing and protecting group. . Anglo-European 
law is primarily concerned with immediate parent and child relationships while 
Navajo law is concerned with the relationship of a child to a group which shares 
the expectation that its members will take care of each other's children. 
This is not uncommon among Indian Peeves. There is one example of 
tribal court family luw policies which are based upon the common law of its 
people. The termination of the parent and child relationship and adoption 
(in the Anglo-European sense) is not permitted in the Makah Tribal Court in 
Washington due to the perception that a child's relationship with his or her 
parents and family is permanent and cannot be tampered with. That court does 
confirm custody relationships for the protection of children or where necessary 
for the receipt of benefits from governmental agencies, but formal legal mechanisms 
respect the basic venues of Makah common law. Interview with the Hon. Jean 
Vitalis, Juvenile Judge, Makah Tribal Court, August 17, 1983. 
CONCLUSION 
I believe that a correct statement of the Navajo common law of adoption 
is that there is an obligation in family members (usually aunts or grandparents 
or a family member who is best i ted to assist a child) to support and assist 
children in need by taking care of them for such periods of time as are necessary 
under the circumstances, or permanently in the case of a permanent tragedy. j\;\ 
affecting the parents. The Navajo Common Law is not concerned with the termination 
of parental rights or creating a legalistic parent and child relationship because 
those concepts are irrelevant in a system which has obligations to children ... 
that extend beyond the parents. Therefore, upon the inability of the parents 
to assist a child or following the occurrence of a family tragedy, children are 
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•>"• 
"adopted" by family meirhers for care which may be temporary or permanent, 
depending upon the circumstances. The mechanism is informal and practical, and v 
based upon community expectations founded in religious and cultural belief. 
DATED: September 19, 1983. 
Solici'tp^to the Courts/bf the Navajo NVti ion 
This opinion is hereby approved. 
^2^2^=i _ 
Chief Justice^of the Navajo Nation 
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£ l X k i l - * » *•* «*• * 
POU*TW JUD4QAI DtSTXCt COL : 
0 * TH| STATI Of UTAH 
IN AND fO« UUM COWNTY 
F I L E D 
n*M&tmo 
RICHARD L. MAXFIELD o£ 
MAXFIELD AND GAMMON
 t I U M A, ^  m m 
Attorney for Petitonera * 
60 Beat 100 South, Bui** _ /ft 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telt 374-6272 
XM THE FOURTH JTOICIAL DISTRICT COURT, UTAH I. I I'l I f 
STATI, Of 'UTAH 
ftp* 
In the Matter 61 u.ii ,toption of; 
HIJ ,i IJ i i ii A D O P T I O N JEREMIAH HALL0HAY, i * ' , M W 3 U F U U P ' 
m %a. Il illuiill II * i / ? 9 ? / 
A M i n o r , i ' r p 
mi i %t in I | u II MI i th> n rider eigi&etl, 'Nphiq I he n a t u x a l it* ' ' *» 
til (11 nun a(II hii I »i pi)f mi i> mi in mi mi N i"i11" named minor en i in 11 ria v i mi a p p e a r e d 
i n Opel* Loijjt iiin'i IIAMIH) lull iiif jqiti i j ^ h t i an 1 r e i p o n i i b i 111 i r»§ 
e x p l a i n e d t o "i 1 rra 11 i ii*tj th t e l f e t l i 1 ^ ""fill consequentea . u l 
my l i g n i n q t i n t imniMii rtii nei ety cnnseni t ha r ny minor c h i l d 
J e r e m i a h H a l l o v a y , may be • % \~ t etl by ian i i w n \ n .en dud Pali i i 
Hawkini Car t a r , ' h e l e t i t loner • h r i e , " liaiel.'i a ' a t t Mia1 . 
doipcj t h l e f u l l | null r f e e if ami «i t imm i n t i n r in* i i f Hu#i n 
o f any p« i IOJI whomsoever . 
DATED and a i q n e d i n Open Court ••hie 
u y ^ ^fe: i 2 ^ £ . 
CECELIA ANN DICK 
" c iii: iiiiii fill mn e l iiiiiiii 1 :;ii in , ii i 1: IIIfc i: ii iiiiiiii iiiiiii ii irii Open Cour t t h i m J • ** day o f f laf , 
111 1 Ill 0 • 
ST THE COURT: 
Sfrnt 
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L,Jiy.HU.SN.CLfcl. 
In the Fourth Judicial District C o o r t ^ 5 - — ^ -
of the SUtt of Utah 
In tnd For Utah County 
ADOPTION OF: 
JEREMIAH HALLOWAY 
MINUTE INTET 
CASCNUMlt* 19,981 
DATED May 30. 1980 
David Saw JUDGE 
Richard L. Maxfield, Atty. 
Reported by Rick Tatton, C.S.R. 
CONSENT OF NATURAL MOTHER 
This matter came before the court for hearing the consent of the 
natural mother to the adoption of the above named child. Richard L. 
Maxfield appeared as legal counsel for the petitioners, Dan Lewis Carter 
and Patricia Hawkins Carter. 
The natural mother was sworn and testified 1n her own behalf and 
executed her Consent to Adoption in open court. The court affixed its 
signature to the same, finding 1t to be freely and voluntarily given 
with a full knowledge of the consequences. 
Before allowing the adoption to proceed, counsel is to cor*ply 
with U.S. Code in obtaining consent from the natural mother's indian 
tribe. 
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EXHIBIT B 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT , r •' 
OP THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY " Jfip£ 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ADOPTION OF JEREMIAH 
HALLCWAY 
R U L I N G 
# 19,961 
Having now considered the arguments of counsel and the mem-
oranda of law on f i l e herein together with the appl icable pro-
v i s i o n s of the Indian Child Welfare Act, the court now holds , r u l e s , 
and f inds as fo l lowst 
R U L I N G 
Under the facts and.circumstances of this case as have now 
been presented to the court and considering the applicable law as 
it relates thereto, the court finds the domicile of the minor child 
to be that of the petitioners. This finding is based upon the fact 
that the child's residence appears to have been voluntarily and 
purposely removed from the natural mother, grandmother, and reservation 
to the petitioners. In view of that fact and the long period of tune 
that the child has been with the petitioners, this court finds that 
apparent "good cause** exists for this court to take jurisdiction and 
that the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act have at this 
stage of the proceedings been satisfied in order to do so. 
Accordingly, this court will proceed to now take evidence on the 
issue of domicile if any further evidence need be presented as to 
that issue and also on the issue of abandonment by the natural mother. 
Evidentiary hearing on those issues will be set upon application of 
either party which application should also indicate the length of 
tune estimated for said hearing. Temporary custody of the minor 
child to remain with the petitioners until further order of the 
cour t. 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
rtzn 
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*HOWARD. LEWIS * F t T t R & t n 
ATTOHNCY* AND COUNCILORS AT LAW 
t a o 1 A * T BOO NorrN ftmanr 
p. O. »o i 77* 
PROVO. UTAH » 4 1 0 1 
TIUIFMON*: S 7 S . t S 4 t 
Attorney, for P E t i t i o n e r s 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION 
OF JEREMIAH HALLOWAY, 
O R D E R 
A person under eighteen vears 
of age, Probate No. 19,981 
This matter came on before the Court for hearing on the 7th o 
April, 1983 and the 16th dav of September, 1983. The petitioners, 
Dan Carter and Pat Carter were present at the April 7th hearing 
and represented by their attorney, Richard 3. Johnson. The Navajc 
Nation was present and represented bv its attornevs, Craig Jay 
Dorsav and Larry Kee Yazzie. The Court, on the basis of testi-
mony, evidence and the argument of counsel, now makes and enters 
the following Order: 
1. In the Court's prior ruling of Julv 14, 1982, the Court 
both sides the opportunity to request an evidentiary hearing on t 
issue of jurisdiction. The Coui;tf after considering the evidence 
finds that this Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter as an 
adverse proceeding for termination of parental rights and adoptic 
of an Indian child not domiciled or residing within the reserva-
tion of the Indian child1 s tribe. 
2. The Court specifically finds that the child was taken f 
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the reservation by a family member, with some of the family's con 
sent and delivered to the petitioners, for adoption. The Court 
finds that the transfer of the child to the petitioners by the 
biological family of the child was done in .what some members of tl 
family felt was the child's best interests. The Court finds that 
bo one in the familv of the child protested placement of the child 
[with the petitioners. 
3. The Court finds that the relocation of the child with the 
petititoners was done with the intent to transfer to the Carters 
full parental rights as it relates to the child and with the furth 
jintent to abandon all parental rights in the child. 
4. The Court finds further that the natural mother and the 
family have abandoned the child and that prior to the Court's 
(awarding of temporary custody of the minor child to the petitioner) 
on July 14, 1982, the petitioners stood in the position of loco 
parentis to Jeremiah Halloway. 
5. The Court finds further that on the basis of the Court's 
^determination of domicile and the Court's finding that the child < 
({had a residence with the petitioners in Utah Countv. State of Utah, 
the Court finds further that there is good cause pursuant to 
I 
[25 U.S.C.S. 51911(b) for this Court to retain jurisdiction based i 
(upon the findings of the Court that there .has been a long period of 
23ntime that the child has been with the petitioners; the fact that nc 
24 Hindian custodian has been appointed and that the custody and * 
251 
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parental rights to the child had been voluntarily relinquished by 
the parents and family; that the child has had little contact with 
the tribe for a significant period of time; that the child has not 
resided on the reservation for a significant period of time and 
that the child has significant contact with this district; and, that 
the convenience and assessibility of witnesses best able to deter-
mine the status, condition and health of the child are located in 
this district. 
6. The Court makes no ruling with respect to termination of 
parental rights as it relates to Jeremiah Halloway, the Court 
determining that the petitioners must meet the burden of 25 U.S.C. 
§1912(f) by proving bevond a resonable doubt from the evidence, 
including testinonv of qualified expert witnesses, that the 
continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custody is 
likelv to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the 
child. The Court will be guided bv the Indian Child Welfare Act 
25 U.S.C.S. §1901 et seq. and those matters contemplated bv said 
Act. 
7. The Court finds that the natural mother has withdrawn hei 
consent prior to the entry of a Decree of Adoption. 
8. Accordingly, the Court orders that the matter be set for 
hearing at a time convenient for counsel to determine whether or 
not parental rights should be terminated. 
9. The Court notes the stipulation of the parties recognizi 
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the rights of the Court to enter Findings of Fact, Conclusions c 
Law and Decree in this matter after a hearing of all of the evid 
10. The Court orders that the records previously ordered t 
become part of the record on April 7. 1983 hearing be made part 
this record. 
11. All motions for sanctions are, as of the present time, 
denied. 
, Odttba.4-, 
DATED this /> day of Irprpml-rr, 1983. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
BY THE COURT: 
McZ'bAVtbiA -•yzfrv AM 
A V W ^ M V ^ CB3C 3£ 
*? 
LARRY KEE YAZZIE 
Attorneys for Navajo Nation 
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v 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ADOPTION OF JEREMIAH 
HALLOWAY, A PERSON 
UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF 
AGE 
D E C I S I O N 
# 1 9 , 9 8 1 
FEDERAL LAW 
This case is before the Court on petitioner's Motion to Terminate 
the Parental Rights of the Natural Mother of Jeremiah Halloway, a 
Navajo Indian Child. The controlling law in this case is the Indian 
Child Welfare Act. The portions of that act we are specifically con-
cerned with are the following: 
25 U.S.C. Sec 1912(d) 
Any party seeking to effect a foster care placement 
of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child 
under State law shall satisfy the court that active efforts 
have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative 
programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family 
and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful. 
25 U.S.C. Sec.1912(f) 
No termination of parental rights may be ordered in such 
proceeding in the absence of a determination, supported by 
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of 
qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custocfy of the 
child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result 
in serious emotional or physicial damage to the child. 
The child was placed with the petitioners on March 23, 1980; the 
biological mother consented to the adoption of the child on May 30, 1980, 
The petitioners notified the Navajo Nation of their intent to adopt the 
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# 19,981 
child and on April 30, 1982 the mother revoked her consent to the 
adoption. Testimony was taken on these matters on April 7, 1983 and 
trial was held on October 22, 1984. 
Testimony of experts concerning the effect of taking the child 
from the petitioner's home and replacing him in the reservation is 
summarized here. 
Damage to the Child 
Paul Steven Buckingham 
Mr. Buckingham interviewed the petitioners and Jeremiah. He found 
no signs of depression or identity crisis. (October transcript page 
65). He found them to be extremely bonded (October transcript page 
68). He found that to return the child to the reservation would cause 
at worst "tremendous physhological damage, emotional damage, from the 
fact that he has been taken from the home that he felt loved and bonde< 
to and put in a home where there was a ^ery lost [sic] potential at 
the y/ery least for neglect and at the yery most of physical abuse." 
(October transcript page 77) 
The Navajo Nation has challenged the testimony of Mr. Buckingham 
on the grounds that he did not have sufficient qualifications to testil 
as an expert under the ICWA Mr. Buckingham's qualifications were set 
out as follows: Bachelors Degree in Science and Psychology from BYU it 
1972; Masters of Social Work from the University of Utah in 1974; 
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# 19,981 
Clinical Worker for L.D.S. Social Services for last eight years; 
case worker in the Indian Placement Program for Navajo children. He 
has also worked with Navajo children on the reservation. He has had 
a Navajo youth in his home for the last five years. These are ample 
qualifications in light of In the Matter of K.A.B.E. and K.B.E, 325 
NW2d 840 (S.D. 1982). In that case, the South Dakota Supreme Court 
found that a person who had worked as a social worker for over four 
years, had a bachelor of arts degree in social work and had contact 
with Indians on a regular basis was a qualified expert under the ICWA. 
See also, In re the Welfare of Fisher, 643 P.2d 887 (Wash. App. 1982). 
Dr. Robert M. Crist 
Dr. Robert M. Crist also testified regarding the effect of return-
ing the child to the reservation. He stated that "the likelihood of 
that is very great that you would be rupturing the child-parent bond 
which is one of those primary necessary developments in young people 
and children. You would be placing him in a new strange environment 
for him. There would be a questions as to who would be the*parent 
figures in the future." Again, the Navajo Nation challenged Dr. 
Crist's qualifications to testify as an expert. While the witness's 
experience had not been with Navajo people per se, his work in psy-
chiatry and minority integration are sufficient to qualify him to 
testify. 
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Dr. Samuel Roll 
Dr. Samuel Roll, called on behalf of the Navajo Nation, submitted 
a report (Exhibit 4) based upon his evaluation of the child and back-
ground information supplied by counsel for the tribe. Dr. Roll found 
that the child is mildly depressed and that he has a negative image of 
Indians. With regard to the child's attachment to the petitioners, 
Dr. Rol1 found that 
Jeremiah is ^ery closely and warmly bonded and attached 
to the Carters. It is clear that he sees them as faithful 
and powerful sources of stimulation, confidence and security. 
He also looks to them for positive productive discipline. His 
love and bonding to them very strongly speaks to the value that 
the relationship with the Carters has for him. It will be ex-
tremely difficult for Jeremiah to make a break with the Carters 
and will cause considerable pain and a period of painful mourn-
ing. It is clear that Jeremiah will not be able to go through 
this period successfully without close supervision and pro-
fessional help. 
Nevertheless, Dr. Roll's opinion was that the child should be taken 
from the petitioner's home and replaced with the tribe so that he would 
not suffer an identify crisis in his adolescent years. 
Dr. Robert J. Howell 
Testimony and a report (Exhibit 3) prepared by Dr. Robert J. 
Howell reveal that after his examination of the child, and conversa-
tions with the child's teachers and the petitioners, he formed a pro-
fessional opinion as to the effect of removing the child from his 
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present circumstances: 
It is my opinion that the probability of emotional 
damage taking place which would result from removing Mich?*] 
from the Carter home, far outweighs the potential conflict 
as to Michael['s] not having a clear identity of himself as 
an Indian, and yet, also knowing that he is not Caucasion. 
It is my belief that the probability of emotional damage is 
at a ^ery high level of certainty--beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Specifically, Dr. Howell's findings were as follows: 
1. Michael is a bright youngster who has no memory of 
his life for, two years and ten months on the reservation. 
2. Michael is well adjusted in the home that he is now 
in and sees Mr. and Mrs. Carter as his parents. In my opinion, 
the Carters are his psychological parents. 
3. It is my opinion that Michael will be emotionally 
damaged by taking him out of the home. The nearly five years 
that he has spent with the Carters, especially, when consider-
ing the early age that he came with them, clearly speaks to 
the importance of his continuing to live with them. 
4. I agree with Dr. Roll that effort should be made to 
inculcate in Michael an appreciation for his heritage, and I 
see no reason why contact could not be effected between Cecelia 
Sanders and Michael. 
5. I could not find any evidence that Michael was de-
pressed, if he was depressed when Dr. Roll saw him, it is likely 
that this was a reaction to his fears that he would be taken 
away from the Carters. He told his school teacher Paula Farrer 
that he was going to see a man to determine if he could keep 
living with the carters. 
In addition to the testimony of experts regarding the effect of 
removing the child from the petitioner's home, there was (in the April 
hearing) some testimony regarding the fitness of his Indian custodians. 
In In the Matter of J.H.L. and P.L.L.H., 316 NW2d 650 (S.D. 1982) 
the court found that evidence of conduct of not only the natural parem 
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but also "other persons in and about the residence" may support a 
trial court's finding that severe emotional or physical damage would 
be likely if the child were returned to the natural parents, Jjd.at 651 
In the present case, the record indicates that the child's grandmother 
and other members of the extended family are alcoholic (April transcri 
pages 23-25,30); the natural mother's husband did not like the child 
nor did he want him in the marital relationship (April transcript page 
21-23); the natural mother willingly gave the child up for adoption 
(April transcript page 31) and only revoked her consent to the adoptioi 
after the Navajo Nation indicated its disapproval of the adoption. 
There is also testimony, although not uncontroverted, that the mother 
revoked her consent only after being subject to duress by the Navajo 
Nation. (April transcript pages 60-62). 
An Arizona court has held that an Indian mother who revokes her 
relinquishment of parental rights is entitled to the return of the 
child in the absence of evidence of her fitness as a parent or any 
attempt to preserve the parent-child relationship. Matter of Appeal in 
Pima County, 635 P.2d 187 (Ariz. App. 1981). In that case, the court 
also seemed to belittle the adoptive parent's argument that return of 
the child would be emotionally traumatic: 
Any potential emotional trauma to the child if the con-
templated adoption is aborted was engendered by the conduct 
of the adoptive parents not adhering to the mandates of the 
Act. 
Id. at 193. 
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The relevant facts in the present case are quite different and 
distinguishable from Matter of Appeal, In that case the adoptive parent 
had had custody of the child for only about four months before the nat-
ural mother revoked her relinquishment. In the case at bar, the pe-
titioners had custody of the child for a full two years before there 
was any indication that the natural mother would revoke her consent to 
the adoption. At that time the child had already developed emotional 
and psychological bonds with the petitioners and it would be unfair to 
punish the child because the adoptive parents did not send him off to 
the reservation immediately upon hearing that the biological mother had 
changed her mi nd. 
Rehabilitative Efforts 
In the first hearing conducted on April 7, 1983, the natural 
mother testified that the primary care of Jeremiah after the initial 
six month period was with the child's Indian grandmother (Page 20). 
She testified that at the time physical custody of the child was trans-
ferred to the grandmother, the step-father was apparently abusing 
Jeremiah, He did not like the child because it was not his son (Page 
20). In addition, he stated he was not going to bother with the child 
and would not care for or support Jeremiah and would not give the chil 
the normal love that a father would give a child (Pages 22-23). 
The mother testified that there was only one sister who would tak 
the child and she was determined not to be fit (Pages 45-46). 
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The most important testimony concerning the frustrated rehabil-
itation in the case comes from Ms. Ella Shirley- On page 86 of the 
transcript, she explains the shared care concept. In her testimony, 
she stated that if the natural parents could not take care of the chil 
then the extended family would then be charged with the care. Ms. 
Shirley testified specifically that there was a maternal aunt and 
sister who could be used. However, the record clearly indicates the 
unsuitabi1ity of all of the extended family. On page 108 of the trans 
cript, the social worker was asked questions as to what decision she 
would have made as far as rehabilitation of the family unit or place-
ment in 1980. Starting on page 109 she was asked that if the facts 
revealed that the members of the extended family who wanted the child 
were not fit custodians, would adoption outside the Tribe be considered 
The social worker testified that they would simply place the child with 
another Navajo family. The social worker admits based upon those facts 
rehabilitation with the natural family would have been discontinued and 
the child would have been placed with another Navajo family. The socia 
worker agreed that from the notes of the case worker it appeared that 
the natural mother vascilated continually between wanting thje child 
back and not wanting the child (Page 112). 
Another social worker testified that the first referral to the 
social agencies was because Jeremiah was neglected (Page 119). The 
social worker stated that "they were interested in taking the child, 
but after doing a thorough investigation of the sisters, we decided 
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that placement with those relatives would not work (Page 120). 
Accordingly, the court finds that the burden of rehabilitation and 
working with the family has been met. 
STATE LAW 
In addition to the provisions of the ICWA, the State of Utah has 
set forth certain requirements which must be met before the rights of 
a parent may be terminated. One of the things that satisfy state re-
quirements for termination is abandonment. Utah Code Annotated Sec. 
78-3a-48(l) states in relevant part: 
The court may decree an involuntary termination of all parental 
rights with respect to one or both parents if the court finds . , 
(b) That the parent or parents have abandoned the chtld. It 
shall be prima facie evidence of abandonment that the parent or 
parents, although having legal custody of the child have sur-
rendered physical custody of the child, and for a period of six 
months following such surrender have not manifested to the child 
or to the person having the physical custody of the child a firrr 
intention to resume physical custody or to make arrangements for 
the care of the chi Id . . . 
Under, the guidelines laid down by the above statute, the 
natural mother's sustained absence of any showing of interest in the 
child for a two year period establishes prima facie evidence of aban-
donment. 
In State v. J.T, 578 P.2d 831 (Utah 1978) the State Division 
of Family Services had placed children of the-litigant mother in 
foster homes after she had released them to the agency. Despite her 
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attempts to remain in contact with her children, the state refused to 
tell her where the two youngest were. Consequently, she had no contac 
with them for two and one-half years. Eventually, when the mother 
sought custody of the children, the State sought to terminate her 
parental rights on the basis of abandonment. The Supreme Court found 
that there could be no abandonment where everytime the parent sought tc 
see the children she was denied visitation. 
In the case before the court, the mother knew that the petitioners 
had the child and at all times relevant to this action their phone 
number and address were 1isted in the telephone directory, nevertheless, 
she made no attempt to contact the child. 
Conclusion 
In light of the foregoing, the court finds 1) that the evidence 
(including expert testimony) established beyond a reasonable doubt 
that to return Jeremiah to his Indian custodians would result in serious 
emotional or physical damage to him; 2) that active efforts have been 
undertaken to attempt the rehabilitation of the Indian family and have 
failed; and 3) that the biological mother knowingly and voluntarily 
abandoned the child as defined in Utah Code Annoted Sec. 78-3a-48(l). 
Accordingly, the amended petition of adoption is granted. 
Dated this ,1/*" day of January, 1985. 
/0 :.S./ ._. 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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IK THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE NAVAJO KattVft* ffcCK. A?i:ov 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OP WINDOW ROCK, ARIZOI'A 
IN THE HATTER OF: ) 
) 
JEREMIAH HALLOWAY, DOB: 5/14/77 ) Ho. VR-JV-CV-71-^ 
) 
A person under eighteen years of age. ) O R D E R 
This matter having come before the Court this 12th day of October, at 
8:30 am, those present being Craig J. Dorsay, counsel for the Kavajo 
Nation; no representative for respondents Dan and Patricia Carter appearing 
before the Court; testimony having been presented and arguments trade; and 
the Court hereby being fully advised in the premises: 
THE COURT HEREBY FINDS 
1. That Jeremiah Halloway, DOB: S/14/77, is tat enrolled Navajo child, 
C# 427.273. 
2. That Jeremiah Halloway vas born out of wedlock to Cecelia (Celine) 
Dick, now known as Cecelia Saunders, an enrolled member of the Navajo 
Tribe, C# 122,217, in Iyanbito, Hew Mexico. 
3. That Cecelia Saunders has always been and still is a domiciliary 
and resident of the Have jo reservation. 
4. That child-rearing of Jeremiah was shared between Cecelia Saunders 
and members of her extended family on the reservation, from his birth until 
March of 1980. 
5. That Jarealah * u roaoved froo the reservation fcy a asternal aunt, 
folly Ann Dick, la March, 1980, and vas transported to Utah for placeaent 
la a non-Indian prospective adoptive family. 
i 
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6. That the consent of the internal grandmother Bessie Bt(\?y, in 
whose here Jercniah then rcrided, wif rot obtained for such removal. 
7. T!.ct re crcer vas obtained from the courts of the Navajo Nction 
authcrizinp removal of Jeremiah from the reservation. 
Rm Tnpt Cecejie Saunders vas transported to Provo, Utah, ct the 
expense of the adoptive parents to execute a written consent to adoption of 
Jeremiah Hallcvay. 
9. That under the Navajo Tribal Code, 7 K.T.C. f 253 and 9 K.T.C. f 
1053, and pursuart to Navajo common lav, the donicile of Jereniah Hallovay 
has at all times remained within the boundaries of the reservation. 
10. That under Navajo statutes and common law, the courts of the 
Navajo Nation have exclusive Jurisdiction to determine the custody of 
Jeremiah Halloway. 
IK That 7 N.T.C. f 204 directs that in all civil cases the Court of 
the Navajo Tribe shall apply any lavs of the United States that may be 
applicable. 
12. That the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICVA), 25 USC If 
1901*1963, applies to this proceeding and Is Incorporated by reference. 
13. That under the ICWA, 25 USC f 1911(a), the courts of the Navajo 
Nation have exclusive Jurisdiction over Jeremiah Halloway. 
14. That under the ICVA, 25 USC If 1913(a), 1914, this Court is a 
court of competent Jurisdiction. . 
15. That on July 14, 1982, and October 6, 1983, the District Court of 
Utah County, State of Utah, In Probate No. 19981, entered orders holding 
that the Navajo Ration did not have exclusive jurisdiction over Jeremiah 
Halloway and that the State of Utah should retain Jurisdiction to decide 
his custody. 
16. That these orders by the District Court of the State of Utah are 
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in violation of the statutes. common lav and public policy of the Navajo 
Nation, which confirms the exclusive Jurisdiction of the tribe over Jeresiah 
Hallovay. 
17. That these orders by the District Court of Dtah were in violation 
of the exclusive Jurisdiction section of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 
OSC I 1911(a), as veil as other applicable sections of that statute. 
18. That a proceeding vas commenced under the Indian Child Welfare 
Act, 25 USC I 1914, and the Navajo Tribal Code, In this Court on August 6, 
1984, to invalidate the Utah State proceeding, Ho. 19,981. 
19. That this Court haa Jurisdiction over the respondents, Dan and 
Patricia Carter, under 9 N.T.C. I 1055(c), vhich provides for Jurisdiction 
over any adult vho removes a Havajo child from the custody of the parent 
and detains such child after demands are made for the return of the child. 
20. That respondents Dan and Patricia Carter have refused to return 
the child to the Navajo reservation. 
21* That personal service of process of the Hot ion to Invalidate on 
Dan and Patricia Carter vas authorised by order of this Court on August 9, 
1984. 
22. That the interests of the Navajo Nation in Jeremiah Hallovay are 
sufficient to authorize the service of process beyond reservation boundar-
ies. 
23. That return of service for the Motion to Invalidate, supporting 
* 
* 
brief and Notice of Rearing on respondents Dan and Patricia Carter in 
Spanish Fork Utah has been filed vith this Court. 
24. That respondents Dan and Patricia Carter have been afforded due 
process la this proceeding and have chosen not to appaar before thia Court. 
IT 18 THEREFORE ORDERED* ADJUDGED AID DECREED: 
1. Under tha statutes and coupon law of the lavajo Nation, and under 
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the Indicr; Ch'H Welfare Act of 1978, this Court has exclufive Jurisdiction 
tc determine the custody and disposition of Jereciah Hallovay, DOB: 5/14/77, 
C# 427.273. 
2. Tha District Court for Utah County, State of Otah, Probate No. 
19,°M, vr- without subject natter Jurisdiction to receive the consent to 
adoption froa Cecelia Saunders, to entertain the adoption petition of 
respondents Den and Patricia Carter, and to enter any orders involving the 
custody cl Jeremiah Hallovay. 
3. The actions of the District Court for Utah County, State of Utah, 
Probate No. 19,981 are In violation of the Indian Child Welfare Act and are 
hereby Invalidated pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 USC f 1914. 
4. The Navajo Division of Social Welfare and Department of Justice 
shall take all necessary steps to secure the return of Jeremiah Hallovay to 
the Navajo reservation. 
5. A hearing to decide the permanent custody of Jeremiah Hallovay 
ahall be scheduled in this Court upon his return to the reservation. 
Respondents Dan and Patricia Carter shall present their Petition for 
Adoption to this Court at that time. 
6. Counsel for the Navajo Nation shall prepare Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Lav for the Court by October 29, 1984. 
7. Because of the serious nature of this proceeding and the fact that 
It la a case of first Impression In this Court or any other court in the 
United States, this Court will Issue an opinion supporting this Order In 
the near future. It OtDERED this &E day of October, 1984. 
-.:.„•:: A.\. : : .• :.v?v if *Z^£JYIJ\I?B* 
THE JNSTRt.. 3 0 C FILE 'M T H£ Judge oxthe District Court 
as 
JPYrS.OIsJHE KAV/JC 1rt.3£ 
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DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 
Bureau of Indian Affairs 
Guidelines for State Courts; Indian 
Child Custody Proceedings 
This notice is published in exercise of 
authority delegated by the Secretary of 
the Interior to the Assistant Secretary— 
Indian Affairs by 209 DM 8. 
There was published in the Federal 
Register, Vol. 44, No. 79/Monday, April 
23,1979 a notice entitled Recommended 
Guidelines for State Courts—Indian 
Child Custody Proceedings. This notice 
pertained directly to implementation of 
the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 
Pub. L 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069. 25 U.S.C 
1901 et scq. A subsequent Federal 
Register notice which invited public 
comment concerning the above was 
published on June 5,1379. As a result of 
comments received, the recommended 
guidelines were revised and are 
provided below in final form. 
Introduction 
Although the rulemaking procedures 
of the Administrative Procedures Act 
have been followed in developing these 
guidelines, they are not published as 
regulations because they are not 
intended to have binding legislative 
effect. Many of these guidelines 
represent the interpretation of !he 
Interior Department of certain 
provisions of the Act. Other guidelines 
provide procedures which, if followed, 
will help assure that rights guaranteed 
by the Act are protected when state 
courts decide Indian child custody 
matters. To the extent that the 
Department's interpretations of the Act 
are correct, contrary interpretations by 
the courts would be violations of the 
Act. If procedures different from those 
recommended in these guidelines are 
adopted by a state, their adequacy to 
protect rights guaranteed by the Act will 
have to be judged on their own merits. 
Where Congress expressly delegates 
to the Secretary the primary 
responsibility for interpreting a statutory 
term/regulations interpreting that terra 
have legislative effect. Courts are not 
free to set aside those regulations simply 
because they would have interpreted 
that statute in a different manner. 
Where, however, primary responsibility 
for interpreting a statutory term rests 
with the courts, administrative 
interpretations of statutory terms are 
given important but not controlling 
significance. Dattcrton v. Francis, 432 
U.S. 410, 424-425 (1977). 
In other words, when the Department 
writes rules needed to carry out 
responsibilities Congress has explicity 
imposed on the Department, those rules 
are binding. A violation of those rules is 
a violation of the law. When, however, 
the Department writes rules or 
guidelines advising some other agency 
how it should carry out responsibilities 
explicitly assigned to it by Congress, 
those rules or guidelines are not, by 
themselves, binding. Courts will take 
what this Department has to say into 
account in such instances, but they are 
free to act contrary to what the 
Department has said if they are 
convinced that the Department's 
guidelines are not required by the 
statute itself. 
Portions of the Indian Child Welfare 
Act do expressly delegate to the 
Secretary of the Interior responsibility 
for interpreting statutory language. For 
example, under 25 U.S.C. 1918. the 
Secretary is directed to determine 
whether a plan for reassumption of 
jurisdiction is "feasible" as that term is 
used in the statute. This and other areas 
where primary responsibility for 
implementing portions of the Act rest 
with this Department, are covered in 
regulations promulgated on July 31,1979, 
at 44 FR 45092. 
Primary responsibility for interpreting 
other language used in the Act. however, 
rests with the courts that decide Indian 
child custody cases. For example, the 
legislative history of the Act states 
explicitly that the use of the term "good 
cause" was designed to provide state 
courts with flexibility in determining the 
disposition of a placement proceeding 
involving an Indian child. S. Rep. No. 
95-597, 95th Cong.. 1st Scss. 17 (1977). 
The Department's interpretation of 
statutory language of this type is 
published in these guidelines. 
Some commenters asserted that 
Congressional delegation to this 
Department of authority to promulgate 
regulations with binding legislative 
effect with respect to all provisions of 
the Act is found at 25 U.S.C 1952, which 
states, "Within one hundred and eighty 
days after November 8,1978, the 
Secretary shall promulgate such rules 
and regulations as may be necessary to 
carry out the provisions of this chapter." 
Promulgation of regulations with 
legislative effect with respect to most of 
the responsibilities of state or tribal 
courts under the Act, however, is not 
necessary to carry out the Act. State and 
tribal courts are fully capable of 
carrying out the responsibilities imposed 
on them by Congress without being 
under the direct supervision of this 
Department. 
Nothing in the legislative history 
indicates that Congress intended this 
Department to exercise supervisory 
control over state or tribal courts or to 
legislate for them with respect to Indian 
child custody matters. For Congress to 
assign to an administrative agency such 
supervisory control over courts would 
be an extraordinary step. 
Nothing in the language or legislative 
history of 25 U.S.C. 1952 compels the 
conclusion that Congress intended to 
vest this Department with such 
extraordinary power. Both the language 
and the legislative history indicate that 
the purpose of that section was simply 
to assure that the Department moved 
promptly to promulgate regulations to 
carry out the responsibilities Congress 
had assigned it under the Act. 
Assignment of supervisory authority 
over the courts to an administrative 
agency is a measure so at odds with 
concepts of both federalism and 
separation of powers that it should not 
be imputed to Congress in the absence 
of an express declaration of 
Congressional intent to that effect. 
Some commenters also recommended 
that the guidelines be published as 
regulations and that the decision of 
whether the law permits such 
regulations to be binding be left to the 
court. That approach has not been 
adopted because the Department has an 
obligation not to assert authority that it 
concludes it does not have. 
Each section of the revised guidelines 
is accompanied by commentary 
explaining why the Department believes 
states should adopt that section and to 
provide some guidance where the 
guidelines themselves may need to be 
interpreted in the light of specific 
circumstances. 
The original guidelines used the word 
"should" instead of "shall" in most 
provisions. The term "should" was used 
to communicate the fact that the 
guidelines were the Department's 
interpretations of the Act and were not 
intended to have binding legislative 
effect. Many commenters, however, 
interpreted the use of "should" as an 
attempt by this Department to make 
statutory requirements themselves 
optional That was not the intent If a 
state adopts those guidelines, they 
should be stated in mandatory terms. 
For that reason the word "shall" has 
replaced "should" in the revised 
guidelines. The status of these 
guidelines as interpretative rather than 
legislative in nature is adequately set 
out in 4he introduction. 
In some instances a state may wish to 
establish rules that provide even greater 
protection for rights guaranteed by the 
Act than those suggested by these 
guidelines. These guidelines are not 
intended to discourage such action. Cart 
should be taken, however, that the 
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>vision of additional protections to 
ne parties to a child custody 
needing does not deprive other 
rties of rights guaranteed to them by 
• Act. 
n some instances the guidelines do 
!e more than restate the statutory 
Suage. This is done in order to make 
guidelines more complete so that 
y can be followed without the need 
«;fer to the statute in every instance, 
ission of any statutory language, of 
:rse. does not in any way affect the 
Micability of the statute. 
\ number of commenters 
ommended that special definitions of 
dence and domicile be included in 
• guidelines. Such definitions were not 
luded because these terms are well 
ned under existing state law. There 
o indication that these state law 
initions tend to undermine in any 
y the purposes of the Act 
ommending special definitions for 
purpose of this Act alone would 
ply provide unnecessary 
^plications in the law. 
\ number of commenters 
ommended that the guidelines 
ude recommendations for tribal-state 
cements under 25 U.S.C 1919. A 
nber of other commenters, however, 
cized the one provision in the 
inal guidelines addressing that 
ject as tending to impose on such 
cements restrictions that Congress 
: not intend should be imposed 
ause of the wide variation in the 
ations and attitudes of states and 
es, it is difficult to deal with that 
e in the context of guidelines. The 
artment is currently developing 
orials to aid states and tribes with 
* agreements. The Department hopes 
: jve those materials available later 
year. For these reasons, the 
ision in the original guidelines 
cerning tribal-state agreements has 
n deleted from the guidelines, 
he Department has also received 
:y requests for assistance from tribal 
ts in carrying out the new 
onsibilities resulting from the 
,age of this Act The Department 
nds to provide additional guidance 
!
 assistance in that area also in the 
?. Providing guidance to state 
s was given a higher priority 
-i.jse the Act imposes many more 
<*dures on state courts than it does 
ibai courts. 
fciny commenters have urged the 
? irtment to discuss the effect of the 
on the financial responsibilities of 
•?s and tribes to provide services to 
<n children. Many such services are 
• d in large part by the Department 
ealth. Education, and Welfare. The 
ies and regulations of that 
Department will have a significant 
impact on the issue of financial 
responsibility. Officials of Interior and 
HEW will be discussing this issue with 
each other. It is anticipated that more 
detailed guidance on questions of 
financial responsibility will be provided 
as a result of those consultations. 
One commenter recommended that 
the Department establish a monitoring 
procedure to exercise its right under 25 
U.S.C. 1915(e) to review state court 
placement records. HEW currently 
reviews state placement records on a 
systematic basis as part of its 
responsibilities with respect to statutes 
it administers. Interior Department 
officials are discussing with HEW 
officials the establishment of a 
procedure for collecting data to review 
compliance with the Indian Child 
Welfare Act 
Inquiries concerning these % 
recommended guidelines may be 
directed to the nearest of the following 
regional and field offices of the Solicitor 
for the Interior Department: 
Office of the Regional Solicitor, Department 
of the Interior. 510 L Street. Suite 408, 
Anchorage. Alaska 99501. (907) 265-5301. 
Office of the Regional Solicitor, Department 
of the Interior, Richard B. Russell Federal 
Building. 75 Spring St.. SW.. Suite 1328. 
Atlanta. Georgia 30303. (404) 221-4447. 
Office of the Regional Solicitor. Department 
of the Interior, c/o U.S. Fish & Wildlife 
Service. Suite 308,1 Gateway Center. 
< Newton Comer. Massachusetts 02158, (617) 
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Guidelines for State Courts 
A. Policy 
B. Pre-trial requirements 
1. Determination that child is an Indian 
2. Determination of Indian child's tribe 
3. Determination that placement is covered 
by the Act 
4. Determination of jurisdiction 
5. Notice requirements 
6. Time limits and extensions 
7. Emergency removal of an Indian child 
8. Improper removal from custody 
C Requests for transfer to tribal court 
1. Petitions under 25 U.S.C. { 1911(b) for 
transfer of proceeding 
2. Criteria and procedures for ruling on 25 
U.S.C 11911(b) transfer petitions 
3. Determination of good cause to the 
contrary 
4. Tribal court declination of transfer 
0. Adjudication of involuntary placements, 
adoptions or terminations of parental 
rights 
1. Access to reports 
2. Efforts to alleviate need to remove child 
from parents or Indian custodians 
3. Standards of evidence 
4. Qualified expert witnesses 
E. Voluntary proceedings 
1. Execution of consent 
2. Content of consent document 
3. Withdrawal of consent to placement 
4. Withdrawal of consent to adoption 
F. Dispositions 
1. Adoptive placements 
2. Foster care or pre-adoptive placements 
3. Good cause to modify preferences 
G. Post-trial rights 
1. Petition to vacate adoption 
2. Adult adoptee rights 
3. Notice of change in child's status 
4. Maintenance ol records 
A. Policy 
*(1) Congress through the Indian Child 
Welfare Act has expressed its clear 
preference for keeping Indian children 
with their families, deferring to tribal 
judgment on matters concerning the 
custody of tribal children* and placing 
Indian children who must be removed 
from their homes within their own 
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families or Indian tribes. Proceedings in 
state courts involving the custody of 
Indian children shall follow strict 
procedures and meet stringent 
requirements to justify any result in an 
individual case contrary to these 
preferences. The Indian Child Welfare 
Act, the federal regulations 
implementing the Act, the recommended 
guidelines and any state statutes, 
regulations or rules promulgated to 
implement the Act shall be liberally 
construed in favor of a result that is 
consistent with these preferences. Any 
ambiguities in any of such statutes, 
regulations, rules or guidelines shall be 
resolved in favor of the result that is 
most consistent with these preferences. 
(2) In any child custody proceeding 
where applicable state or other federal 
law provides a higher standard of 
protection to the rights of the parent or 
Indian custodian than the protection 
accorded under the Indian Child 
Welfare Act, the state court shall apply 
the state or other federal law, provided 
that application of that law does not 
infringe any right accorded by the 
Indian Child Welfare Act to an Indian 
tribe or child. 
A. Commentary 
The purpose of this section is to apply 
to the Indian Child Welfare Act the 
canon of construction that remedial 
statutes are to be liberally construed to 
achieve their purpose. The three major 
purposes are derived from a reading to 
the Act itself. In order to fully implement 
the Congressional intent the rule shall 
be applied to all implementing rules and 
state legislation as well. 
Subsection A.(2) applies to canon of 
statutory construction that specific 
language shall be given precedence over 
general -language. Congress has given 
certain specific rights to tribes and 
Indian children. For example, the tribe 
has a right to intervene in involuntary 
custody proceedings. The child has a 
right to learn of tribal affiliation upon 
becoming 18 years old. Congress did not 
intend 25 U.S.C. 1921 to have the effect 
af eliminating those rights where a court 
:oncludes they are in derogation of a 
parental right provided under a state 
itatute. Congress intended for this 
lection to apply primarily in those 
nstances where a state provides greater 
protection for a right accorded to 
»arents under the Act. Examples of this 
nclude State laws which: impose a 
igher burden of proof than the Act for 
"moving a child from a home, give the 
arents more time to prepare after 
jceiving notice, require more effective 
otice, impose stricter emergency 
•moval procedure requirements on 
lose removing a child, give parents 
greater access to documents, or contain 
additional safeguard to assure the 
voluntariness of consent. 
B. Pretrial requirements 
B.l. Determination That Child Is an 
Indian 
(a) When a state court has reason to 
believe a child involved in a child 
custody proceeding is an Indian, the 
court shall seek verification of the 
child's status from either the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs or the child's tribe. In a 
voluntary placement proceeding where a 
consenting parent evidences a desire for 
anonymity, the court shall make its 
inquiry in a manner that will not cause 
the parent's indentity to become 
publicly known. 
(b)(i) The determination by a tribe 
that a child is or is not a member of that 
tribe, is or is not eligible for membership 
in that tribe, or that the biological parent 
is or is not a member of that tribe is 
conclusive. 
(ii) Absent a contrary determination 
by the tribe that is alleged to be the 
Indian child's tribe, a determination by 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs that a child 
is or is not an Indian child is conclusive. 
(c) Circumstances under which a state 
court has reason to believe a child 
involved in a child custody proceeding 
is an Indian include but are not limited 
to the following: 
(i) Any party to the case, Indian tribe, 
Indian organization or public or private 
agency informs the court that the child is 
an Indian child. 
(ii) Any public or state-licensed 
agency involved in child protection 
services or family support has 
discovered information which suggests 
that the child is an Indian child 
(iii) The child who is the subject of the 
proceeding gives the court reason to 
believe he or she is an Indian child 
(iv) The residence or the domicile of 
the child, his or her biological parents, 
or the Indian custodian is known by the 
court to be or is shown to be a 
predominantly Indian community. < 
(v) An officer of the court involved in 
the proceeding has knowledge that the 
child may be an Indian child 
B.l. Commentary 
This guideline makes clear that the 
best source of information on whether a 
particular child is Indian is the tribe 
itself. It is the tribe's prerogative to 
determine membership criteria and to 
decide who meets those criteria. Cohen, 
Handbook of Federal Indian Law 133 
(1942). Because of the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs* long experience in determining 
who is an Indian for a variety of 
purposes, its determinations are also 
entitled to great deference. &?#, e#t 
United States v. Sandoval, 231, U.S. 2t» 
17 (1913). 
Although tribal verification is 
preferred, a court may want to seek 
verification from the BIA in those 
voluntary placement cases where the 
parent has requested anonymity and the 
tribe does not have a system for keeping 
child custody matters confidential. 
Under the Act confidentially is given 
a much higher priority in voluntary 
proceedings than in involuntary ones. 
The Act mandates a tribal right of notice 
and intervention in involuntary 
proceedings but not in voluntary ones. 
Cf. 25 U.S.C § 1912 with 25 U.S.C 
§ 1913. For voluntary placements, 
however, the Act specifically directs 
state courts to respect parental requests 
for confidentiality. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(c) 
The most common voluntary placement 
involves a newborn infant. 
Confidentiality has traditionally been a 
high priority in such placements. The 
Act reflects that traditional approach by 
requiring deference to requests for 
anonymity in voluntary placements but 
not in involuntary ones. This guideline 
specifically provides that anonymity not 
be compromised in seeking verification 
of Indian status. If anonymity were 
compromised at that point, the statutory 
requirement that requests for anonymity 
be respected in applying the preferences 
would be meaningless. 
Enrollment is not always required in 
order to be a member of a tribe. Some 
tribes do not have written rolls. Others 
have rolls that list only persons that 
were members as of a certain date. 
Enrollment is the common evidentiary 
means of establishing Indian status, but 
it is not the only means nor is it 
necessarily determinative. United States 
v. Broncheau. 597 F.2d 126a 1203 (9th 
Cir. 1979). 
The guidelines also list several 
circumstances which shall trigger an 
inquiry by the court and petitioners to 
determine whether a child is an Indian 
for purposes of this Act This listing is 
not intended to be complete, but it does 
list the most common circumstances 
giving rise to a reasonable belief that * 
child may be an Indian. 
B.2. Determination of Indian Child's 
Tribe 
(a) Where an Indian child is a member 
of more than one tribe or is eligible for 
membership in more than one tribe but 
is not a member of any of them, the 
court is called upon to determine with 
which tribe the child has more 
significant contacts. 
(b) The court shall send the notice 
specified in recommended guideline R4» 
to each such tribe. The notice shall 
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specify the other tribe or tribes that are 
boing considered as the child's tribe and 
invite each tribe's views on which tribe 
shall be so designated. 
(i) In determining which tribe shall be 
designated the Indian child's tribe, the 
court shall consider, among other things. 
the following factors: 
(i) length of residence on or near the 
i eservation of each tribe and frequency 
of contacts with each tribe; 
(i:j child's participation in activities of 
t»ach tribe: 
(iii) child's fluency in the language of 
tr;u:h tribe: 
(iv) whether there has been a previous 
KIjudication with respect to the child by 
• ?:ourt of one of the tribes: 
(v) residence on or near one of the 
tribes' reservation by the child's 
datives: 
(vij tribal membership of custodial 
parent or Indian custodian: 
(vi) interest asserted by each tribe in 
»?spcnse to the notice specified in 
subsection B.2.(b) of these guidelines; 
md 
(viii) the child's self identification. 
(d) The court's determination together 
vvith the reasons for it shall be set out in 
! written document and made a part of 
he record of. the proceeding. A copy of 
'at document shall be sent to each 
•jrty \o the proceeding and to each 
orson or governmental agency that 
oeived notice of the proceeding. 
(e) If the child is a member of only one 
! be. that tribe shall be designated the 
uiiun child's tribe even though the 
hi Id is eligible for membership in 
mother tribe. If a child becomes a 
member of one tribe during or after the 
roceeding. that tribe shall be 
!es:gnated as the Indian child's tribe 
\ ith respect to all subsequent actions 
elated to the proceeding. If the child 
> comes a member of a tribe other than 
\o. one designated by the court as the 
idian child's tribe, actions taken based 
'\ the court's determination prior to the 
uid's becoming a tribal member 
mtinue to be valid. 
2. Commentary 
This guideline requires the court to 
"tify all tribes that are potentially the 
.dian child's tribe so that each tribe 
ay assert its claim to that status and 
e court may have the benefit of the 
i'ws of each tribe. Notification of all 
* tribes is also necessary so the court 
i consider the comparative interest of 
ch tribe in the child's welfare in 
king its decision. That factor has long 
n regarded an important 
isideration In making child custody 
is ions, 
he significant factors listed in this 
tion are based on recommendations 
by tribal officials Involved in child 
welfare matters. The Act itself and the 
legislative history make it clear that 
tribal rights are to be based on the 
existence of a political relationship 
between the family and the tribe. For 
that reason, the guidelines make actual 
tribal membership of the child 
conclusive on this issue. 
The guidelines do provide, however, 
that previous decisions of a court made 
on its own determination of the Indian 
child's tribe are not invalidated simply 
because the child becomes a member of 
a different tribe. This*provision is 
included because of the importance of 
stability and continuity to a child who 
has been placed outside the home by a 
court If a child becomes a member 
before a placement is made or before a 
change of placement becomes necessary 
for other reasons, however, then that 
membership decision can be taken into 
account without harm to the child's need 
for stable relationships. 
We have received several 
recommendations that "Indian child's 
tribe" status be accorded to all tribes in 
which a child is eligible for membership. 
The fact that Congress, in the definition 
of "Indian child's tribe," provided a 
criterion for determining which is the 
Indian child's tribe, is a clear indication 
of legislative intent that there be only 
one such tribe for each child. For 
purposes of transfer of jurisdiction, there 
obviously can be only one tribe to 
adjudicate the case. To give more than 
one tribe "Indian child's tribe" status for 
purposes of the placement preferences 
would dilute the preference accorded by 
Congress to the tribe with which the 
child has the more significant contacts. 
A right of intervention could be 
accorded a tribe with which a child has 
less significant contacts without 
undermining the right of the other tribe. 
A state court can* if it wishes and state 
law permits, permit intervention by 
more than one tribe. It could also give s 
second tribe preference in placement 
after attempts to place t child with s 
member of the first tribe or in a home or 
institution designated by the first tribe 
had proved unsuccessful. So long as the 
special rights of the Indian child's tribe 
are respected, giving special status to 
the tribe with the less significant 
contacts is not prohibited by the Act 
and may, in many instances, be a good 
way to comply with the spirit of the Act 
Determinations of the Indian child's 
tribe for purposes of this Act shall not 
serve as any precedent for other 
situations. The standards in this statute 
and these guidelines are designed with 
child custody matters in mind. A 
different determination may be entirely 
appropriate In other legal contexts. 
B.3. Determination That Placement Is 
Covered by the Act 
(a) Although most juvenile 
delinquency proceedings are not 
covered by the Act. the Act does apply * 
to status offenses. 6uch as truancy and 
incorrigibility, which can only be 
committed by children, and to any 
juvenile delinquency proceeding that 
results in the termination of a parental 
relationship. 
(b) Child custody disputes arising in 
the context of divorce or separation 
proceedings or similar domestic 
relations proceedings are not covered by 
the Act so long as custody is awarded to 
one of the parents. 
(c) Voluntary placements which do 
not operate to prohibit the child's parent 
or Indian custodian from regaining 
custody of the child at any time are not 
not covered by the Act Where such 
placements are made pursuant to a 
written agreement that agreement shall 
state explicitly the right of the parent or 
custodian to regain custody of the child 
upon demand. 
B.3. Commentary 
The purpose of this section is to deal 
with some of the questions the 
Department has been receiving 
concerning the coverage of the Act 
The entire legislative history makes it 
clear that the Act is directed primarily 
at attempts to place someone other than 
the parent or Indian custodian in charge 
of raising an Indian child—whether on a 
permanent or temporary basis. Although 
there is some overlap, juvenile 
delinquency proceedings are primarily 
designed for other purposes. Where the 
child is taken out of the home for 
committing a crime it is usually to 
protect society from further offenses by 
the child and to punish the child in order 
to persuade that child and others not to 
commit other offenses. 
Placements based on status offenses 
(actions that are not a crime when 
committed by an adult), however, are 
usually premised on the conclusion that 
the present custodian of the child is not 
providing adequate care or supervision. 
To the extent that a status offense poses 
any immediate danger to society, it is 
usually also punishable as an offense 
which would be a crime if committed by 
an adult For that reason status offenses 
are treated the same as dependency 
proceedings and are covered by the Act 
and these guidelines, while other 
juvenile delinquency placements are 
excluded 
While the Act excludes placements 
based on an act which would be a crime 
if committed by an adult, it does cover 
terminations of parental rights even 
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where they are based on an act which 
would be a crime if committed by an 
adult. Such terminations are not 
intended as punishment and do not 
prevent the child from committing 
further offenses. They are based on the 
conclusion that someone other than the 
present custodian of the child should be 
raising the child. Congress has 
concluded that courts shall make such 
judgments only on the basis of evidence 
that serious physical or emotional harm 
to the child is likely to result unless the 
child is removed. 
The Act excludes from coverage an 
award of custody to one of the parents 
"in a divorce proceeding." If construed 
narrowly, this provision would leave 
custody awards resulting from 
proceedings between husband and wife 
for separate maintenance, but not for 
dissolution of the marriage bond within 
the coverage of the Act. Such a narrow 
interpretation would not be in accord 
with the intent of Congress. The 
legislative history indicates that the 
exemption for divorce proceedings, in 
part, was included in response to the 
views of this Department that the 
protections provided by this Act are not 
needed in proceedings between parents. 
In terms of the purposes of this Act, 
there is no reason to treat separate 
maintenance or similar domestic 
relations proceedings differently from 
divorce proceedings. For that reason the 
statutory term "divorce proceeding'* is 
construed to include other domestic 
relations proceedings between spouses. 
The Act also excludes from its 
coverage any placements that do not 
deprive the parents or Indian custodians 
of the right to regain custody of the child 
upon demand. Without this exception a 
court appearance would be required 
every time an Indian child left home to 
go to school Court appearances would 
also be required for many informal 
caretaking arrangements that Indian 
parents and custodians sometimes make 
'or their children. This statutory 
exemption is restated here in the hope 
hat it will reduce the instances in which 
ndian parents are unnecessarily 
nconvenienced by being required to 
;ive consent in court to such informal 
rrangements. 
Some private groups and some states 
nter into formal written agreements 
tith parents for temporary custody [See 
,g. Alaska Statutes J 47.10.230). The 
iiidelines recommend that the parties to 
ich agreements explicitly provide for 
turn of the child upon demand if they 
? not wish the Act to apply to such 
acements. Inclusion of such a 
ovision is advisable because courts 
squently assume that when an 
agreement is reduced to writing, the 
parties have only those rights 
specifically written into the agreement. 
B.4. Determination of Jurisdiction 
(a) In any Indian child custody 
proceeding in state court, the court shall 
determine the residence and domicile of 
the child. Except as provided in Section 
B.7. of these guidelines, if either the 
residence or domicile is on a reservation 
where the tribe exercises exclusive 
jurisdiction over child custody 
proceedings, the proceedings in state 
court shall be dismissed. 
(b) If the Indian child has previously 
resided or been domiciled on the 
reservation, the state court shall contact 
the tribal court to determine whether the 
child is a ward of the tribal court. 
Except as provided in Section B.7. of 
these guidelines, if the child is a ward of 
a tribal court, the state court 
proceedings shall be dismissed 
B.4. Commentary 
The purpose of this section is to 
remind the state court of the need to 
determine whether it has jurisdiction 
under the Act. The action is dismissed 
as soon as it is determined that the court 
lacks jurisdiction except in emergency 
situations. The procedures for 
emergency situations are set out in 
Section B.7. 
B.5. Notice Requirements 
(a) In any involuntary child custody 
proceeding, the state court shall make 
inquiries to determine if the child 
involved is a member of an Indian tribe 
or if a parent of the child is a member of 
an Indian tribe and the child is eligible 
for membership in an Indian tribe. 
(b) In any involuntary Indian child 
custody proceeding, notice of the 
proceeding shall be sent to the parents 
and Indian custodians, if any, and to 
any tribes that may be the Indian child's 
tribe by registered mail with return 
receipt requested The notice shall be 
written in clear and understandable 
language and include the following -
information: 
(i) The name of the Indian child 
(ii) His or her tribal affiliation. 
(iii) A copy of the petition, complaint 
or other document by which the 
proceeding was initiated 
(iv) The name of the petitioner and the 
name and address of the petitioner's 
attorney. 
(v) A statement of the right of the 
biological parents or Indian custodians 
and the Indian child's tribe to intervene 
in the proceeding. 
(vi) A statement that if the parents or 
Indian custodians are unable to afford 
counsel, counsel will be appointed to 
represent them. 
(vii) A statement of the right of the 
natural parents or Indian custodians and 
the Indian child's tribe to have, on 
request, twenty days (or such additional 
time as may be permitted under state 
law) to prepare for the proceedings. 
(viii) The location, mailing address 
and telephone number of the court 
(ix) A statement of the right of the 
parents or Indian custodians or the 
Indian child's tribe to petition the court 
to transfer the proceeding to the Indian 
child's tribal court 
(x) The potential legal consequences 
of an adjudication on future custodial 
rights of the parents or Indian 
custodians. 
(xi) A statement in the notice to the 
tribe that since child custody 
proceedings are usually conducted on a 
confidential basis, tribal officials should 
keep confidential the information 
contained in the notice concerning the 
particular proceeding and not reveal it 
to anyone who does not need the 
information in order to exercise the 
tribe's right under the Act 
(c) The tribe, parents or Indian 
custodians receiving notice from the 
petitioner of the pendency of a child 
custody proceeding has the right upon 
request, to be granted twenty days (or 
such additional time as may be 
permitted under state law) from the date 
upon which the notice was received to 
prepare for the proceeding. 
(d) The original or a copy of each 
notice sent pursuant to this section shall 
be filed with the court together with any 
return receipts or other proof of service. 
9e) Notice may be personnally served 
on any person entitled to receive notice 
in lieu of mail service. 
(f) If a parent or Indian custodian 
appears in court without an attorney, 
the court shall inform him or her of the 
right to appointed counsel the right to 
request that the proceeding be 
transferred to tribal court or to object to 
such transfer, the right to request 
additional time to prepare for the 
proceeding and the right (if the parent or 
Indian custodian is not already a party) 
to intervene in the proceedings. 
(g) If the court or a petitioniing party 
has reason to believe that a parent or 
Indian custodian is not likely to 
understand the contents of the notice 
because of lack of adequate 
comprehension of written English, a 
copy of the notice shall be sent to the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs agency nearest 
to the residence of that person 
requesting that Bureau of Indian Affairs 
personnel arrange to have the notice 
explained to that person in the language 
that he or she best understands. 
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8.5. Commentary 
This section recommends that state 
courts routinely inquire of participants 
in child custody proceedings whether 
the child is an Indian. If anyone asserts 
that the child is an Indian or that there 
is reason to believe the child may be an 
Indian, then the court shall contact the 
tribe or the Bureau of Indian Affairs for 
verification. Refer to sections B.l and 
B.2 of these guidelines. 
This section specifies the information 
to be contained in the notice. This 
information is necessary so the persons 
who receive notice will be able to 
exercise their rights in a timely manner. 
Subparagraph (xi) provides that tribes 
hall be requested to assist in 
maintaining the confidentiality of the 
proceeding. Confidentiality may be 
difficult to maintain—especially where 
small tribes are involved and the 
'ikelihood that the family involved is 
well known by tribal officials is great. 
Although Congress was concerned with 
•onfidentiality, it concluded that the 
nterest of tribes in the welfare of their 
children justified taking some risks with 
onfidentiality—especially in 
i voluntary proceedings. It is 
-asonable, however, to ask tribal 
'icials to maintain as much 
•/J? fidentiality as possible consistent 
vith the exercise of tribal rights under 
r
'>.c Act. 
The time limits are minimum ones 
•quired by the Act. In many instances, 
ore time may be available under state 
ourt procedures or because of the 
rcumstances of the particular case. 
in such instances, the notice shall 
ate that additional time is available. 
The Act requires notice to the parent 
" Indian custodian. At a minimum, 
irents must be notified if termination 
parental rights is a potential outcome 
ace it is their relationship to the child 
hat is at stake. Similarly, the Indian 
stodians must be notified of any 
.tion that could lead to the custodians' 
sing custody of the child. Even where 
nly custody is an issue, noncustodial 
arents clearly have a legitimate 
\terest in the matter. Although notice to 
jth parents and Indian custodians may 
ot be required in all instances by the 
xt or the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
1
 S. Constitution, providing notice to 
oth is in keeping with the spirit of the 
rx For that reason, these guidelines 
commend notice be sent to both. 
Subsection (d) requires filing the 
tice with the court so there will be a 
jmplete record of efforts to comply 
;th the Act 
Subsection (e) authorizes personal 
rvices since it is superior to mail 
rvices and provides greater protection 
or rights as authorized by 25 U.S.C 1921. 
Since serving the notice does not 
involve any assertion of jurisdiction 
over the person served, personal notice 
may be served without regard to state or 
reservation boundaries. 
Subsections (f) and (g) provide 
procedures to increase the likelihood 
that rights are understood by parents 
and Indian custodians. 
B.6. Time Limits and Extensions 
(a) A tribe, parent or Indian custodian 
entitled to notice of the pendency of a 
child custody proceeding has a right, 
upon request, to be granted an 
additional twenty days from the date 
upon which notice was received to 
prepare for participation in the 
proceeding. 
(b) The proceeding may not begin 
until all of the following dates have 
passed: 
(i) ten days after the parent or Indian 
custodian (or Secretary where the 
parent or Indian custodian is unknown 
to the petitioner) has received notice; 
(ii) ten days after the Indian child's 
tribe (or the Secretary if the Indian 
child's tribe is unknown to the 
petitioner) has received notice; 
(iii) thirty days after the parent or 
Indian custodian has received notice if 
the parent or Indian custodian has 
requested an additional twenty days to 
prepare for the proceeding; and 
(iv) Thirty days after the Indian 
child's tribe has received notice if the 
Indian child's tribe has requested an 
additional twenty days to prepare for 
the proceeding. 
(c) The time limits listed in this 
section are the minimum time periods 
required by the Act The court may grant 
more more time to prepare where state 
law permits, 
B.8. Commentary 
This section attempts to clarify the 
waiting periods required by the Act 
after notice has been received of an 
involuntary Indian child custody 
proceeding. Two Independent rights are 
involved-—the right of the parents or 
Indian custodians and the right of the 
Indian child's tribe. The proceeding may 
not begin until the waiting periods to 
which both are entided have passed. 
This section also makes clear that 
additional extensions of time may be 
granted beyond the minimum required 
by the Act 
B.7. Emergency Removal of an Indian 
Child 
(a) Whenever an Indian child is 
removed from the physical custody of 
the child's parents or Indian custodians 
pursuant to the emergency removal or 
custody provisions of state law, the 
agency responsible for the removal 
action shall immediately cause an 
inquiry to be made as to the residence 
and domicile of the child. 
(b) When a court order authorizing 
continued emergency physical custody 
is sought, the petition for that order shall 
be accompanied by an affidavit 
containing the following information: 
(i) The name, age and last known 
address of the Indian child. 
(ii) The name and address of the 
child's parents and Indian* custodians, if 
any. If 3uch persons are unknown, a 
detailed explanation of what efforts 
have been made to locate them shall be 
included. 
(iii) Facts necessary to determine the 
residence and the domicile of the Indian 
child and whether either the residence 
or domicile is on an Indian reservation. 
If either the residence or domicile is 
believed to be on an Indian reservation, 
the name of the reservation shall be 
stated. 
(iv) The tribal affiliation of the child 
and of the parents and/or Indian 
custodians. 
(v) A specific and detailed account of 
the circumstances that lead the agency 
responsible for the emergency removal 
of the child to take that action. 
(vi) If the child is believed to reside or 
be domiciled on a reservation where the 
tribe exercises exclusive jurisdiction 
over child custody matters, a statement 
of efforts that have been made and are 
being made to transfer the child to the 
tribe's jurisdiction. 
(vii) A statement of the specific 
actions that have been taken to assist 
the parents or Indian custodians so the 
child may safely be returned to their 
custody. 
(c) 11 the Indian child is not restored to 
the parents or Indian custodians or 
jurisdiction is not transferred to the 
tribe, the agency responsible for the 
child's removal must promptly 
commence a state court proceeding for 
foster care placement If the child 
resides or is domiciled on a reservation 
where the tribe exercise* exclusive 
jurisdiction over child custody matters, 
such placement must terminate as soon 
as the imminent physical damage or 
harm to the child which resulted in the 
emergency removal no longer exists or 
as soon as the tribe exercises 
jurisdiction over the case—whichever is 
earlier. 
(d) Absent extraordinary 
circumstances, temporary emergency 
custody shall not be continued for more 
than 90 days without a determination by 
the court supported by clear and 
convincing evidence and the testimony 
of at least one qualified expert witness* 
A-35
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that custody of the child by the parent or 
Indian custodian is likely to result in 
serious emotional or physical damage to 
the child. 
B.7. Commentary 
Since jurisdiction under the Act is 
based on domicile and residence rather 
than simple physical presence, there 
may be instances in which action must 
be taken with respect to a child who is 
physically located off a reservation but 
is subject to exclusive tribal jurisdiction, 
In such instances the tribe will usually 
not be able to take swift action to 
exercise its jurisdiction. For that reason 
Congress authorized states to take 
temporary emergency action. 
Since emergency action must be taken 
without the careful advance deliberation 
normally required, procedures must be 
established to assure that the emergency 
actions are quickly subjected to review. 
This section provides procedures for 
prompt review of such emergency 
actions. It presumes the state already 
has such review procedures and only 
prescribes additional procedures that 
shall be followed in cases involving 
Indian children. 
The legislative history clearly states 
that placements under such emergency 
procedures are to be as short as 
possible. If the emergency ends, the 
placement shall end. State action shall 
also end as soon as the tribe is ready to 
take over the case. 
Subsection (d) refers primarily to the 
period between when the petition is 
filed and when the trial court renders its 
decision. The Act requires that, except 
for emergencies, Indian children are not 
to be removed from their parents unless 
a court finds clear and convincing 
evidence that the child would be in 
serious danger unless removed from the 
home. Unless there is some kind of time 
limit on the length of an "emergency 
removal" (that is, any removal not made 
pursuant to a finding by the court that 
there is clear and convincing evidence 
that continued parental custody would 
make serious physical or emotional 
harm likely), the safeguards of the Act 
could be evaded by use of long-term 
emergency removals. 
Subsection (d) recommends what is, 
in effect, a speedy trial requirement The 
court shall be required to comply with 
the requirements of the Act and reach a 
decision within 90 days unless there are 
"extraordinary circumstances" that 
make additional delay unavoidable. 
B.8. Improper Removal From Custody 
(a) If, in the course of any Indian child 
custody proceeding, the court has 
reason to believe that the child who Is 
the subject of the proceeding may have 
been improperly removed from the 
custody of his or her parent or Indian 
custodian or that the child has been 
improperly retained after a visit or other 
temporary relinquishment of custody, 
and that the petitioner is responsible for 
such removal or retention, the court 
shall immediately stay the proceedings 
until a determination can be made on 
the question of improper removal or 
retention. 
(b) If the court finds that the petitioner 
is responsible for an improper removal 
or retention, the child shall be 
immediately returned to his or her 
parents or Indian custodian. 
B.8. Commentary 
This section is designed to implement 
25 U.S.C § 1920. Since a finding of 
improper removal goes to the 
jurisdiction of the court to hear the case 
at all, this section provides that the 
court will decide the issue as soon as it 
arises before proceeding further on the 
merits. 
C. Requests for Transfer to Tribal Court 
CI. Petitions under 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) 
for transfer of proceeding 
Either parent, the Indian custodian or 
the Indian child's tribe may, orally or in 
writing, request the court to transfer the 
Indian child custody proceeding to the 
tribal court of the child's tribe. The 
request shall be made promptly after 
receiving notice of the proceeding. If the 
request is made orallyit shall be 
reduced to writing by the court and 
made a part of the record. 
Cl. Commentary 
Reference is made to 25 U.S.C 1911(b) 
in the title of this section in order to 
clarify that this section deals only with 
transfers where the child is not 
domiciled or residing on an Indian 
reservation. 
So that transfers can occur as quickly 
and simply as possible, requests can be 
made orally. 
This section specifies that requests 
are to be made promptly after receiving 
notice of the proceeding. This is a 
modification of the timeliness 
requirement that appears in the earlier 
version of the guidelines. Although the 
statute permits proceedings to be 
commenced even before actual notice is 
received by parties entided to notice, 
those parties do not lose their right to 
request a transfer simply because 
neither the petitioner nor the Secretary 
was able to locate them earlier. 
Permitting late transfer requests by 
persons and tribes who were notified 
late may cause some disruption. It will 
also, however, provide an incentive to 
the petitioners to make a diligent effort 
to give notice promptly in order to avoid 
such disruptions. 
The Department received a number of 
comments objecting to any timeliness 
requirement at alL Commenters pointed 
out that the statute does not explicitly 
require transfer requests to be timely. 
Some commenters argued that imposing 
such a requirement violated tribal and 
parental rights to intervene at any point 
in the proceedings under 25 U.S.C 
S 1911(c) of the Act. 
While the Act permits intervention at 
any point in the proceeding, it does not 
explicitly authorize transfer requests at 
any time. Late interventions do not have 
nearly the disruptive effect on the 
proceeding that last minute transfers do 
A case that is almost completed does 
not need to be retried when intervention 
is permitted. The problems resulting 
from late intervention are primarily 
those of the intervenor, who has lost the 
opportunity to influence the portion of 
the proceedings that was completed 
prior to intervention. 
Although the Act does not explicitly 
require transfer petitions to be timely, it 
does authorize the court to refuse to 
transfer a case for good cause. When a 
party who could have petitioned earlier 
waits until the case is almost complete 
to ask that it be transferred to another 
court and retried, good cause exists to 
deny the request 
Timeliness is a proven weapon of the 
courts against disruption caused by 
negligence or obstructionist tactics on 
the part of counsel. If a transfer petition 
must be honored at any point before 
judgment a party could wait to see how 
the trial is going in state court and then 
obtain another trial if it appears the 
other side will win. Delaying a transfer 
request could be used as a tactic to wear 
down the other side by requiring the 
case to be tried twice. The Act was not 
intended to authorize such tactics and 
the "good cause" provision is ample 
authority for the court to prevent them. 
C2. Criteria and Procedures for Ruling 
on 25 U.S.C 11911(b) Transfer Petitions 
(a) Upon receipt of a petition to* 
transfer by a parent Indian custodian or 
the Indian child's tribe, the court must 
transfer unless either parent objects to 
such transfer, the tribal court declines 
jurisdiction, or the court determines that 
good cause to the contrary exists for 
denying the transfer. 
(b) If the court believes or any party 
asserts that good cause to the contrary 
exists, the reasons for such belief or 
assertion shall be stated in writing and 
made available to the parties who are 
petitioning for transfer. The petitioners 
shall have the opportunity to provide the 
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court with their views on whether or not 
good cause to deny transfer exists, C.2. 
Commentary 
Subsection (a) simply states the rule 
provided in 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b). 
Since the Act gives the parents and 
the tribal court of the Indian'child*s tribe 
an absolute veto over transfers, there is 
no need for any adversary proceedings 
if the parents or the tribal court opposes 
transfer. Where it is proposed to deny 
transfer on the grounds of "good cause." 
however, all parties need an opportunity 
to present their views to the court. 
C.3. Determination of Good Cause to the 
Contrary 
(a) Good cause not to transfer the 
proceeding exists if the Indian child's 
tribe does not have a tribal court as 
defined by the Act to which the case can 
be transferred 
(b) Good cause not to transfer the 
proceeding may exist if any of the 
following circumstances exists: 
(i) The proceeding was at an 
advanced stage when the petition to 
transfer was received and the petitioner 
did not fie the petition promptly after 
receiving notice of the hearing. 
(ii) The Indian child is over twelve 
years of age and objects to the transfer. 
(iii) The evidence necessary to decide 
the case could not be adequately 
presented in the tribal court without 
undue hardship to the parties or the 
witnesses. 
(iv) The parents of a child over five 
years of age are not available and the 
child has had little or no contact with 
the child's tribe or members of the 
child's tribe. 
(c) Socio-economic conditions and the 
perceived adequacy of tribal or Bureau 
of Indian Affairs social services or 
judicial systems may not be considered 
in a determination that good cause 
exists. 
(d) The burden of establishing good 
cause to the contrary shall be on the 
party opposing the transfer. 
C.3. Commentary 
All five criteria that were listed in the 
earlier version of the guidelines were 
highly controversial Comments on the 
first two criteria were almost 
unanimously negative. The first criterion 
was whether the parents were still 
living. The second was whether an 
Indian custodian or guardian for the 
child had been appointed. These criteria 
were criticized as irrelevant and 
arbitrary. It was argued that children 
who are orphans or have no appointed 
Indian custodian or guradian are no 
"lore nor less in need of the Act's 
protections that other children. It was 
also pointed out that these criteria are 
contrary to the decision in Wisconsin 
Potawctomies of the Hannahville Indidh 
Community v. Houston, 397 F. Supp. 719 
(W.D. Mich 1973). which was explicitly 
endorsed by the committee that drafted 
that Act The court in that case found 
that tribal jurisdiction existed even 
through the children involved were 
orphans for whom no guardian had been 
appointed. 
Although there was some support for 
the third and fourth criteria, the 
preponderance of the comment 
concerning them was critical. The third 
criteria was whether the child had little 
or no contact with his or her Indian tribe 
for a significant period of time. The 
fourth was whether the child had ever 
resided on the reservation for a 
significant period of time. These criteria 
were criticized, in part because they 
would virtually exclude from transfers 
infants who were born off the 
reservation. Many argued that the tribe 
has a legitimate interest in the welfare 
of members who have not had 
significant previous contact with the 
tribe or the reservation. Some also 
argued that these criteria invited the 
state courts to be making the kind of 
cultural decisons that the Act 
contemplated should be made by tribes. 
Some argued that the use of vague 
words in these criteria accorded state 
courts too much discretion. 
The fifth criteria was whether a child 
over the age of twelve objected to the 
transfer. Comment on this criteria was 
much more evenly divided and many of 
the critics were ambivalent They 
worried that young teenagers could be 
too easily influenced by the judge or by 
social workers. They also argued that 
fear of the unknow would cuase many 
teenagers to make an ill-considered 
decision against transfer. 
The first four criteria in the earlier 
version were all directed toward the 
question of whether the child's 
connections with the reservation were 
so tenuous that transfer back to the tribe 
is not advised The circumstances under 
which it may be proper for the state 
court to take such considerations into 
account are set out in the revised-
subsection (iv). 
It is recommended that in most cases 
state court judges not be called upon to 
determined whether or not a child's 
contacts with a reservation are so 
limited that a case should not be 
transferred. This may be a valid 
consideration since the shock of 
changing cultures may, in some cases, 
be harmful to the child This 
determination, however, can be made by 
the parent who has a veto over transfer 
to tribal court 
This reasoning does not apply, 
however, where there is no parent 
available to make that decision. The 
guidelines recommend that state courts 
be authorized to make such 
determinations only in those cases 
where there is no parent available to 
make it 
State court authority to make such 
decisions is limited to those cases where 
the child is over five years of age. Most 
children younger than five years can be 
expected to adjust more readily to a 
change in cultural environment 
The fifth criterion has been retained 
It is true that teenagers may make some 
unwise decisions, but it is also true that 
their judgment has developed to the 
extent that their views ought to be taken 
into account in making decisions about 
their lives. 
The existence of a tribal court is made 
an absolute requirement for transfer of a 
case. Clearly, the absence of a tribal 
court is good cause not to ask the tribe 
to try the case. 
Consideration of whether or not the 
case can be properly tried in tribal court 
without hardship to the parties or 
witnesses was included on the strength 
of the section-by-section analysis in the 
House Report on the Act which stated 
with respect to the § 1911(b), 'The 
subsection is intended to permit a State 
court to apply to apply a modified 
doctrine of forum non conveniens, in 
appropriate cases, to insure that the 
rights of the child as an Indian, the 
Indian parents or custodian, and the 
tribe are fully protected" Where a child 
is in fact living in a dangerous situation, 
he or she should not be forced to remain 
there simply because the witnesses 
cannot afford to travel long distances to 
court 
Application of this criterion will tend 
to limit transfers to cases involving 
Indian children who do not live very far 
from the reservation. This problem may 
be alleviated in some instances by 
having the court come to the witnesses. 
The Department is aware of one case 
under that Act where transfer was 
conditioned on having the tribal court 
meet in the city where the family lived 
Some cities hav substantial populations 
of members of tribes from distant 
reservations. In such situations some 
tribes may wish to appoint members 
who live in those cities as tribal judges. 
The timeliness of the petition for 
transfer, discussed at length in the 
commentary to section Cl, is listed as a 
factor to be considered Inclusion of this 
criterion is designed to encourage the 
prompt exercise of the right to petition 
for transfer in order to avoid 
unnecessary delays. Long periods of 
uncertainty concerning the future are 
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generally regarded as harmful to the 
well-being of children. For that reason* it 
is especially important to avoid 
unnecessary delays in child custody 
proceedings. 
Almost all commenters favored 
retention of the paragraph stating that 
reservation socio-economic conditions 
and the perceived adequacy of tribal 
institutions are not to be taken into 
account in making good cause 
determinations. Some commenters did 
suggest however, that a case not be 
transferred if it is clear that a particular 
disposition of the case that could only 
be made by the state court held 
especially great promise of benefiting 
the child. 
Such considerations are important but 
they have not been listed because the 
Department believes such judgments are 
best made by tribal courts. Parties who 
believe that state court adjudication 
would be better for such reasons can 
present their reasons to the tribal court 
and urge it to decline jurisdiction. The 
Department is aware of one case under 
the Act where this approach is being 
used and believes it is more in keeping 
with the confidence Congress has 
expressed in tribal courts. 
Since Congress has established a 
policy of preferring tribal control over 
custody decisions affecting tribal 
members, the burden of proving that an 
exception to that policy ought to be 
made in a particular case rests on the 
party urging that an exception be made. 
This rule is reflected in subsection (d). 
C.4. Tribal Court Declination of Transfer 
(a) A tribal court to which transfer is 
requested may decline to accept such 
transfer. 
(b) Upon receipt of a transfer petition 
he state court shall notify the tribal 
:ourt in writing of the proposed transfer, 
rhe notice shall state how long the 
ribal court has to make its decision. The 
ribal court shall have at least twenty 
ays from the receipt of notice of a 
roposed transfer to decide whether to 
ecline the transfer. The tribal court 
tay inform the state court of its 
ecision to decline either orally or in 
ritfng. 
(c) Parties shall file with the tribal 
>urt any arguments they wish to make 
ther for or against tribal declination of 
ansfer. Such arguments shall be made 
ally in open court or in written 
eadings that are served on all other 
rties. 
(d) If the case is transferred the state 
urt shall provide the tribal court with 
available information on the case. 
C.4. Commentary 
The previous version of this section 
provided that the state court should 
presume the tribal court has declined to 
acenpt jurisdiction unless it hears 
otherwise. The comments on this issue 
were divided. This section has been 
revised to require the tribal court to 
decline the transfer affirmatively if it 
docs not wish to take the case. This 
approach is in keeping with the 
apparent intent of Congress. The 
language in the Act providing that 
transfers are "subject to declination by 
the tribal court" indicates that 
affirmative action by the tribal court fs 
required to decline a transfer. 
The recommended time limit for a 
decision has been extended from ten to 
twenty days. The additional time is 
needed for the court to become apprised 
of factors it may want to consider in 
determining whether or not to decline 
the transfer. 
A new paragraph has been added 
recommending that the parties assist the 
tribal court in making its decision on 
declination by giving the tribal court 
their views on the matter. 
Transfers ought to be arranged as 
simply as possible consistent with due 
process. Transfer procedures are a good 
subject for tribal-state agreements under 
25 CJ.S.C. § 1919. 
D. Adjudication of Involuntary 
Placements, Adoptions* or Terminations 
or Terminations of Parental Rights 
D.l. Access to Reports 
Each party to a foster care placement 
or termination of parental rights 
proceeding under State law involving an 
Indian child has the right to examine all 
reports or other documents filed with 
the court upon which any decision with 
respect to such action may be based. No 
decision of the court shall be based on 
any report or other document not filed 
with the court 
D.l* Commentary 
The first sentence merely restates the 
statutory language verbatim. The second 
sentence makes explicit the implicit 
assumption of Congress—that the court 
will limit its considerations to those 
documents and reports that have been 
filed with the court 
D.2. Efforts To Alleviate Need To 
Remove Child From Parents or Indian 
Custodians 
Any party petitioning a state court for 
foster care placement or termination of 
parental rights to an Indian child must 
demonstrate to the court that prior to the 
commencement of the proceeding active 
efforts have been made to alleviate the 
need to remove the Indian child from his 
or her parents or Indian custodians. 
These efforts shall take into account the 
prevailing social and cultural conditions 
and way of life of the Indian child's 
tribe. They shall also involve and use 
the available resources of the extended 
family, the tribe, Indian social service 
agencies and individual Indian care 
givers. 
DJL Commentary 
This section elaborates on the 
meaning of "breakup of the Indian 
family" as used in the Act. "Family 
breakup" is sometimes used as a 
synonym for divorce. In the context of 
this statute, however, it is clear that 
Congress meant a situation in which the 
family is unable or unwilling to raise the 
child in a manner that is not likely to 
endanger the child's emotional or 
physical health. 
This section also recommends that the 
petitioner take into account the culture 
of the Indian child's tribe and use the 
resources of the child's extended family 
and tribe in attempting to help the 
family function successfully as a home 
for the child. The term "individual 
Indian care givers" refers to medicine 
men and other individual tribal 
members who may have developed 
special skills that can be used to help 
the child's family succeed. 
One commenter recommended that 
detailed procedures and criteria be 
established in order to determine 
whether family support efforts had been 
adequate. Establishing such procedures 
and requirements would involve the 
court in second-guessing the 
professional judgment of social service 
agencies. The Act does not comtemplate 
such a role for the courts and they 
generally lack the expertise to make 
such judgments. 
D.3. Standards of Evidence 
(a) The court may not issue an order 
effecting a foster care placement of an 
Indian child unless clear and convincing 
evidence is presented including the 
testimony of one of more qualified 
expert witnesses, demonstrating that the 
child's continued custody with the 
child's parents of Indian custodian fs 
likely to result in serious emotional or 
physical damage to the child. 
(b) The court may not order a 
termination of parental rights unless die 
court's order is supported by evidence 
beyond a reasonable doubt including 
the testimony of one or more qualified 
expert witnesses, that continued 
custody of the child by the parent or 
Indian custodian is likely to result in 
serious emotional or physical damage to 
the child 
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(c) Evidence that only shows the 
existence of community or family 
poverty, crowded or inadequate 
lousing, alcohol abuse, or non-
informing social behavior does not 
constitute clear and convincing evidence 
hat continued custody is likely to result 
in serious emotional or physical damage 
to the child. To be clear and convincing. 
the evidence must show the existence of 
particular conditions in the home that 
are likely to result in serious emotional 
or physical damage to the particular 
child who is the subject of the 
proceeding. The evidence must show the 
causal relationship between the 
conditions that exist and the damage 
that is likely to result 
D.3. Commentary 
The first two paragraphs are 
essentially restatement of the statutory 
language. By imposing these standards. 
Congress has changed the rules of law 
of many states with respect to the 
placement of Indian children. A child 
may not be removed simply because 
there is someone else willing to raise the 
child who is likely to do a better job or 
that it would be "in the best interests of 
the child'* for him or her to live with 
someone else. Neither can a placement 
or termination of parental rights be 
ordered simply based on a 
determination that the parents or 
custodians are "unfit parents." It must 
be shown that it is shown that it is 
dangerous for the child to remain with 
his or her present custodians. Evidence 
of that must be "clear and convincing" 
for placements and "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" for terminations. 
The legislative history of the Act 
makes it pervasively clear that Congress 
attributes many unwarranted removals 
of Indian children to cultural bias on the 
part of the courts and social workers 
making the decisions. In many cases 
children were removed merely because 
the family did not conform to the 
decision-maker's stereotype of what a 
proper family should be-without any 
testing of the implicit assumption that 
only a family that conformed to that 
stereotype could successfully raise 
children. Subsection (c) makes it clear 
that mere non-conformance with such 
stereotypes or the existence of other 
behavior or conditions that are 
considered bad does not justify a 
placement or termination under the 
standards imposed by Congress. The 
focus must be on whether the particular 
conditions are likely to cause serious 
damage. 
D.4. Qualified Expert Witnesses 
(a) Removal of an Indian child from 
his or her family must be based on 
competent testimony from one or more 
experts qualified to speak specifically to 
the issue of whether continued custody 
by the parents or Indian custodians is 
likely to result in serious physical or 
emotional damage to the child. 
(b) Persons with the following 
characteristics are most likely to meet 
the requirements for a qualified expert 
witness for purposes of Indian child 
custody proceedings: 
(i) A member of the Indian child's 
tribe who is recognized by the tribal 
community as knowledgeable in tribal 
customs as they pertain to family 
organization and childrearing practices. 
(ii) A lay expert witness having 
substantial experience in the delivery of 
child and family services to Indians, and 
extensive knowledge of prevailing social 
and cultural standards and childrearing 
practices within the Indian child's tribe. 
(iii) A professional person having 
substantial education and experience in 
the area of his or her specialty. 
(c) The court or any party may request 
the assistance of the Indian child's tribe 
or the Bureau of Indian Affairs agency 
serving the Indian child's tribe in 
locating persons qualified to serve as 
expert witnesses. 
D.4 Commentary 
The first subsection is intended to 
point out that the issue on which 
qualified expert testimony is required is 
the question of whether or not serious 
damage to the child is likely to occur if 
the child is not removed. Basically two 
questions are involved. First, is it likely 
that the conduct of the parents will 
result in serious physical or emotional 
harm to the child? Second, if such 
conduct will likely cause such harm, can 
the parents be persuaded to modify their 
conduct? 
The party presenting an expert 
witness must demonstrate that the 
witness is qualified by reason of 
educational background and prior 
experience to make judgments on those 
questions that are substantially more 
reliable than judgments that would be 
made by nonexperts. 
The second subsection makes clear 
that knowledge of tribal culture and 
childrearing practices will frequently be 
very valuable to the court Determining 
the likelihood of future harm frequently 
involves predicting future behavior— 
which is influenced to a large degree by 
culture. Specific behavior patterns will 
often need to be placed in the context of 
the total culture to determine whether 
they are likely to cause serious 
emotional harm. 
Indian tribes and Bureau of Indian 
Affairs personnel frequently know 
persons who are knowledgeable 
concerning the customs and cultures of 
the tribes they serve. Their assistance is 
available in helping to locate such 
witnesses. 
£ Voluntary Proceedings 
El. Execution of Consent 
To be valid, consent to a voluntary, 
termination of parental rights or 
adoption must be executed in writing 
and recorded before a judge or 
magistrate of a court of competent 
jurisdiction. A certificate of the court 
must accompany any consent and must 
certify that the terms and consequences 
of the consent were explained in detail 
and in the language of the parent or 
Indian custodian, if English is not the 
primary language, and were fully 
understood by the parent or Indian 
custodian. Execution of consent need 
not be in open court where 
confidentiality is requested or indicated. 
E.1. Commentary 
This section provides that consent 
may be executed before either a judge or 
magistrate. The addition of magistrates 
was made in response to a suggestion 
from Alaska where magistrates are 
found in most small communities but 
"judges" are more widely scattered. The 
term "judge" as used in the statute is not 
a term of art and can certainly be 
construed to include judicial officers 
who are called magistrates in some 
states. The statement that consent need 
not be in open court where 
confidentiality is desired or indicated 
was taken directly from the House 
Report on the Act A recommendation 
that the guideline list the consequences 
of consent that must be described to the 
parent or custodian has not been 
adopted because the consequences can 
vary widely depending on the nature of 
the proceeding, state law and the 
particular facts of individual cases. 
E2. Content of Consent Document 
(a) The consent document shall 
contain the name and birthdate of the 
Indian child, the name of the Indian 
child's tribe, any identifying number or 
other indication of the child's 
membership in the tribe, if any, and the 
name and address of the consenting 
parent or Indian custodian. 
(b) A consent to foster care placement 
shall contain, in addition to the 
'information specified in (a), the name 
and address of the person or entity by or 
through whom the placement was 
arranged, if any, or the name and 
address of the prospective foster 
parents, if known at the time. 
(c) A consent to termination of 
parental rights or adoption shall contain. 
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in addition to the information specified 
in (a), the name and address of the 
person or entity by or through whom 
any preadoptive or adoptive placement 
has been or is to be arranged. 
E.2. Commentary 
This section specifies the basic 
information about the placement or 
termination to which the parent or 
Indian custodian is consenting to assure 
that consent is knowing and also to 
document what took place. 
E.3. Withdrawal of Consent to 
Placement 
Where a parent or Indian custodian 
has consented to a foster care 
placement under state law, such consent 
may be withdrawn at any time by filing, 
in the court where consent was 
executed and filed, an instrument 
executed by the parent or Indian 
custodian. When a parent or Indian 
custodian withdraws consent to foster 
cure placement, the child shall as soon 
38 is practicable be returned to that 
parent or Indian custodian. 
E.J. Commentary 
This section specifies that withdrawal 
of consent shall be filed in the same 
court tvhere the consent document itself 
was executed 
E.4. Withdrawal of Consent to 
Adoption 
A consent to termination of parental 
rights or adoption may be withdrawn by 
the parent at any time prior to entry of a 
final decree of voluntary termination or 
adoption by filing in the court where the 
consent is filed an instrument executed 
under oath by the parent stipulating his 
or her intention to withdraw such 
consent. The clerk of the court where 
the withdrawal of consent is filed shall 
promptly notify the party by or through 
whom any preadoptive or adoptive 
placement has been arranged of such 
filing and that party shall insure the 
return of the child to the parent as soon 
as practicable. 
£.4. Commentary 
This provision recommends that the 
clerk of the court be responsible for 
notifying the family with whom the child 
has been placed that consent has been 
withdrawn. The court's involvement 
frequently may be necessary since the 
biological parents are often not told who 
the adoptive parents are. 
F. Dispositions 
F.l. Adoptive Placements 
(a) In any adoptive placement of an 
fndian child under state law preference 
must be given [in the order listed below) 
absent good cause to the contrary, to 
placement of the child with: 
(i) A member of the child's extended 
family: 
(ii) Other members of the Indian 
child's tribe: or 
(iii) Other Indian families, including 
families of single parents. 
(b) The Indian child's tribe may 
establish a different order of preference 
by resolution. That order of preference 
must be followed so long as placement 
is the least restrictive setting 
appropriate to the child's needs, 
(c) Unless a consenting parent 
evidences a desire for anonymity, the 
court or agency shall notify the child's 
extended family and the Indian child's 
tribe that their members will be given 
preference in the adoption decision. 
F.l. Commentary 
This section makes clear that 
preference shall be given in the order 
listed in the Act, The Act clearly 
recognizes the role of the child's 
extended family in helping to raise 
children. The extended family should be 
looked to first when it becomes 
necessary to remove the child from the 
custody of his or her parents. Because of 
differences in cultures among tribes, 
placement within the same tribe is 
preferable. 
This section also provides that single 
parent families shall be considered for 
placements. The legislative history of 
the Act makes it clear that Congress 
intended custody decisions to be made 
based on a consideration of the present 
or potential custodian's ability to 
provide the necessary care, supervision 
and support for the child rather than on 
preconceived notions of proper family 
composition. 
The third subsection recommends that 
the court or agent make an active effort 
to find out if there are families entitled 
to preference who would be willing to 
adopt the child. This provision 
recognizes, however, that the consenting 
parent's request for anonymity tajces 
precedence over efforts to find a home 
consistent with the Act's priorities. 
F.2. Foster Care or Preadoptive 
Placements 
In any foster care or preadoptive 
placement of an Indian child: 
(a) The child must be placed in the 
least restrictive setting which 
(i) most approximates a family; 
(it) in which his or her special needs 
may be met* and 
(iii) which is in reasonable proximity 
to his or her home. 
(b) Preference must be given in the 
following order, absent good cause to 
the contrary, to placement with: 
fi) A member of the Indian child's 
extended family: 
(ii) A foster home, licensed approved 
or specified by the Indian child's tribe, 
whether on or off the reservation; 
(iii) An Indian foster home licensed or 
approved by an authorized non-Indian 
licensing authority; or 
(iv) An institution for children 
approved by an Indian tribe or operated 
by an Indian organization which has a 
program suitable to meet the child's 
needs. 
(c) The Indian child's tribe may 
establish a different order of preference 
by resolution, and that order of 
preference shall be followed sc long as 
the criteria enumerated in subsection (a) 
are met 
?X Commentary 
This guideline simply restates the 
provisions of the Act 
F.3. Good Cause To Modify Preferences 
(a) For purposes of foster care, 
preadoptive or adoptive placement, a 
determination of good cause not to 
follow the order of preference set out 
above shall be based on one or more of 
the following considerations: 
(i) The request of the biological 
parents or the child when the child is of 
sufficient age. 
(ii) The extraordinary physical or 
emotional needs of the child as 
established by testimony of a qualified 
expert witness. 
(iii) The unavailability of suitable 
families for placement after a diligent 
search has been completed for families 
meeting the preference criteria. 
(b) Thk burden of establishing the 
existence of good cause not to follow 
the order of preferences established in 
subsection (b) shall be on the party 
urging that the preferences not be 
% followed. 
F.3. Commentary 
The Act indicates that the court is to 
give preference to confidentiality 
requests by parents in making 
placements. Paragraph (i) is intended to 
permit parents to ask that the order of 
^preference not be followed because it 
would prejudice confidentiality or for 
other reasons. The wishes of an older 
child are Important in making an 
effective placement 
In a Tew cases a child may need 
highly specialized treatment services 
that are unavailable in the community 
where the families who meet the 
preference criteria live. Paragraph (ii) 
recommends that such considerations be 
considered as good cause to the 
contrary. 
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Paragraph (iii] recommends that a 
diligent attempt to find a suitable family 
meeting the preference criteria be made 
before consideration of a non-preference 
placement be considered. A diligent 
attempt to find a suitable family 
includes at a minimum, contact with the 
child's tribal social service program, a 
search of all county or state listings of 
available Indian homes and contact 
with nationally known Indian programs 
with available placement resources. 
Since Congress has established a 
clear preference for placements within 
the tribal culture, it is recommended in 
subsection (b) that the party urging an 
exception be made be required to bear 
the burden of proving and exception is 
necessary. 
G. Post-Trial Rights 
G.l. Petition To Vacate Adoption 
(a) Within two years after a final 
decree of adoption of any Indian child 
by a state court, or within any longer * 
period of time permitted by the law of 
the state, a parent who executed a 
consent to termination of paternal rights 
or adoption of that child may petition 
the court in which the final adoption 
decree was entered to vacate the decree 
and revoke the consent on the grounds 
that such consent was obtained by fraud 
or duress. 
(b) Upon the filing of such petition, the 
court shall give notice to all parties to 
the adoption proceedings and shall 
proceed to hold a hearing on the 
petition. Where the court finds that the 
parent's consent was obtained through 
fraud or duress, it must vacate the 
decree of adoption and order the 
consent revoked and order the child 
returned to the parent. 
G.l. Commentary 
This section recommends that the 
petition to vacate an adoption be 
brought in the same court in which the 
decree was entered, since that court 
clearly has jurisdiction, and witnesses 
on the issue of fraud or duress are most 
likely to be within its jurisdiction. 
G.2. Adult Adoptee Rights 
(a) Upon application by an Indian 
individual who has reached age 18 who 
was the subject of an adoptive 
placement, the court which entered the 
final decree must inform such individual 
of the tribal affiliations, if any of the 
individual's biological parents and 
provide such other information 
necessary to protect any rights flowing 
from the individual's tribal relationship. 
(b) The section applies regardless of 
whether or not the original adoption 
was subject to the provisions of the Act 
(c) Where state law prohibits 
revelation of the identity of the 
biological parent, assistance of the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs shall be sought 
where necessary to help an adoptee 
who is eligible for membership in a tribe 
establish that right without breaching 
the confidentiality of the record. 
G.2. Commentary 
Subsection (b) makes clear that 
adoptions completed prior to May 7, 
1979, are covered by this provision. The 
Act states that most portions of Title I 
do not "affect a proceeding under State 
law'* initiated or completed prior to May 
7,1979. Providing information to an 
adult adoptee, however, cannot be said 
to affect the proceeding by which the 
adoption was ordered 
The legislative history of the Act 
makes it clear that this Act was not 
intended to supersede the decision of 
state legislatures on whether adult 
adoptees may be told the names of their 
biological parents. The intent is simply 
to assure the protection of rights 
deriving from tribal membership. Where 
a state law prohibits disclosure of the 
identity of the biological parents, tribal 
rights can be protected by asking the 
BIA to check confidentially whether the 
adult adoptee meets the requirements 
for membership in an Indian tribe. If the 
adoptee does meet those requirements, 
the BIA can certify that fact to the 
appropriate tribe. 
G.3. Notice of Change in Child's Status 
(a) Whenever a final decree of 
adoption of an Indian child has been 
vacated or set aside, or the adoptive 
parent has voluntarily consented to the 
termination of his or her parental rights 
to the child or whenever an Indian child 
is removed from a foster care home or 
institution for the purpose of further 
foster care, preadoptive placement, or , 
adoptive placement, notice by the court 
or an agency authorized by the court 
shall be given to the child's biological 
parents or prior Indian custodians. Such 
notice shall inform the recipient of his or 
her right to petition for return of custody 
of the child 
(b) A parent or Indian custodian may 
waive his or her right to such notice by 
executing a written waiver of notice 
filed with the court Such waiver may be 
revoked at any time by filing with the 
court a written notice of revocation, but 
such revocation would not affect any 
proceeding which occurred before the 
filing of the notice of revocation. 
G.3. Commentary 
Tills section provides guidelines to aid 
courts in applying the provisions of 
Section 100 of the Act Section 100 gives 
legal standing to a biological parent or 
prior Indian custodian to petition for 
return of a child in cases of failed 
adoptions or changes in placement in 
situations where there has been a 
termination of parental rights. Section 
106(b) provides the whenever an Indian 
child is removed from a foster care 
home or institution for the purpose of 
further foster care, preadoptive 
placement, or adoptive placement, such 
placement is to be in accordance with 
the provisions of the Act—which 
requires notice to the biological parents. 
The Act is silent on the question of 
whether a parent or Indian custodian 
can waive the right to further notice. 
Obviously, there will be cases in which 
the biological parents will prefer not to 
receive notice once their parental rights 
have been relinquished or terminated 
This section provides for such waivers 
but because the Act establishes an 
absolute right to participate in any 
future proceedings and to petition the 
court for return of the child, the waiver 
is revocable. 
G.4. Maintenance of Records 
The state shall establish a single 
location where all records of every 
foster care, preadoptive placement and 
adoptive placement of Indian children 
by courts of that state will be available 
within seven days of a request by an 
Indian child's tribe or the Secretary. The 
records shall contain, at a minimum, the 
petition or complaint, all substantive 
orders entered in the proceeding, and 
the complete record of the placement 
determination. 
G.4. Commentary 
This section of the guidelines provides 
a procedure for implementing the 
provisions of 25 U.S.C. § 1915(e). This 
section has been modified from the 
previous version which required that all 
records be maintained in a single 
location within the state. As revised this 
section provides only that the records be 
retrievable by a single office that would 
make them available to the requester 
within seven days of a request For 
some states (especially Alaska) 
centralization of the records themselves 
would create major administrative 
burdens. So long as the records can be 
promptly made available at a single 
location, the intent of this section that 
the records be readily available will be 
satisfied 
Forrest )• Gerard, 
Assistant Secretary, Indian Affairs. 
November IS, 1979. 
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§1901 TITLE 25-INDIANS 
Sec. 
1922. Emergency removal or placement of child; 
termination: appropriate action. 
1923. Effective date. 
SUBCHAPTER II-INDIAN CHILD AND FAMILY 
PROGRAMS 
1931. Grants for on or near reservation programs 
and child welfare codes. 
(a) Statement of purpose; scope of pro-
grams. 
(b) Non-Federal matching funds for re-
lated Social Security or other Fed-
eral financial assistance programs; 
assistance for such programs unaf-
fected; State licensing or approval 
for qualification for assistance 
under federally assisted program. 
1932. Grants for off-reservation programs for addi-
tional services. 
1933. Funds for on and off reservation programs. 
(a) Appropriated funds for similar pro-
grams of Department of Health 
and Human Services; appropriation 
in advance for payments, 
(b) Appropriation authorization under 
section 13 of this title. 
1934. "Indian" defined for certain purposes. 
SUBCHAPTER III-RECORDKEEPING. INFOR-
MATION AVAILABILITY. AND TIMETABLES 
1951. Information availability to and disclosure by 
Secretary. 
(a) Copy of final decree or order, other 
information; anonymity affidavit; 
exemption from Freedom of Infor-
mation Act. 
(b) Disclosure of information for enroll-
ment of Indian child in tribe or for 
determination of member rights or 
benefits; certification of entitle-
ment to enrollment. 
1952. Rules and regulations. 
SUBCHAPTER IV-MISCELLANEOUS 
PROVISIONS 
1961. Education; day schools; report to congres-
sional committees; particular consideration 
of elementary grade facilities. 
1962. Omitted. 
1963. Severability of provisions. 
CHAPTER REFERRED TO IN OTHE* SECTIONS 
This chapter is referred to in section 1727 of this 
title. 
§ 1901. Congressional finding* 
Recognizing the special relationship between 
the United States and the Indian tribes and 
their members and the Federal responsibility to 
Indian people, the Congress finds— 
(1) that clause 3, section 8, article I of the 
United States Constitution provides that 
"The Congress shall have Power • • • To reg-
ulate Commerce • • • with Indian tribes" and, 
through this and other constitutional author-
ity, Congress has plenary power over Indian 
affairs; 
(2) that Congress, through statutes, trea-
ties, and the general course of dealing with 
Indian tribes, has assumed the responsibility 
for the protection and preservation of Indian 
tribes and their resources; 
(3) that there is no resource that is more 
vital to the continued existence and integrity 
of Indian tribes than their children and that 
the United States has a direct interest, as 
trustee, in protecting Indian children who are 
members of or are eligible for membership in 
an Indian tribe; 
(4) that an alarmingly high percentage of 
Indian families are broken up by the removal, 
often unwarranted, of their children from 
them by nontribal public and private agencies 
and that an alarmingly high percentage of 
such children are placed in non-Indian foster 
and adoptive homes and institutions; and 
(5) that the States, exercising their recog-
nized jurisdiction over Indian child custody 
proceedings through administrative and judi-
cial bodies, have often failed to recognize the 
essential tribal relations of Indian people and 
the cultural and social standards prevailing in 
Indian communities and families. 
(Pub. L. 95-608. § 2, Nov. 8, 1978, 92 Stat. 3069.) 
SHORT TITLE 
Section 1 of Pub. L. 95-608 provided: "That this Act 
[which enacted this chapterl may be cited as the 
'Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978'." 
§ 1902. Congressional declaration of policy 
The Congress hereby declares that it is the 
policy of this Nation to protect the best inter-
ests of Indian children and to promote the sta-
bility and security of Indian tribes and families 
by the establishment of minimum Federal 
standards for the removal of Indian children 
from their families and the placement of such 
children in foster or adoptive homes which will 
reflect the unique values of Indian culture, and 
by providing for assistance to Indian tribes in 
the operation of child and family service pro-
grams. 
(Pub. L. 95-608, § 3, Nov. 8, 1978, 92 Stat. 3069.) 
§ 1903. Definition! 
For the purposes of this chapter, except as 
may be specifically provided otherwise, the 
term— 
(1) "child custody proceeding" shall mean 
and include— 
(i) "foster care placement" which shall 
mean any action removing an Indian child 
from its parent or Indian custodian for tem-
porary placement in a foster home or insti-
tution or the home of a guardian or conser-
vator where the parent or Indian custodian 
cannot have the child returned upon 
demand, but where parental rights have not 
been terminated; 
(ii) . "termination of parental rightr." 
which shall mean any action resulting in 
the termination of the parent-child relu- * 
tionship; 
(iii) "preadoptive placement" which shall 
mean the temporary placement of an 
Indian child in a foster home or institution 
after the termination of parental rights, but 
prior to or in lieu of adoptive placement; 
and 
(iv) "adoptive placement" which shall 
mean the permanent placement of an 
Indian child for adoption, including any 
action resulting in a final decree of adop-
tion. 
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TITLE 25-INDIANS §1911 
Such term or terms shall not include a place-
ment based upon an act which, if committed 
by an adult, would be deemed a crime or upon 
an award, in a divorce proceeding, of custody 
to one of the parents. 
(2) "extended family member" shall be as 
defined by the law or custom of the Indian 
child's tribe or, in the absence of such law or 
custom, shall be a person who has reached 
the age of eighteen and who is the Indian 
child's grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or 
sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or 
nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent; 
(3) "Indian" means any person who is a 
member of an Indian tribe, or who is an 
Alaska Native and a member of a Regional 
Corporation as defined in 1606 of title 43; 
(4) "Indian child" means any unmarried 
person who is under age eighteen and is 
either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) 
is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe 
and is the biological child of a member of an 
Indian tribe; 
(5) "Indian child's tribe" means (a) the 
Indian tribe in which an Indian child is a 
member or eligible for membership or (b), in 
the case of an Indian child who is a member 
of or eligible for membership in more than 
one tribe, the Indian tribe with which the 
Indian child has the more significant con-
tacts; 
(6) "Indian custodian" means any Indian 
person who has legal custody of an Indian 
child under tribal law or custom or under 
State law or to whom temporary physical 
care, custody, and control has been trans-
ferred by the parent of such child; 
(7) "Indian organization" means any group, 
association, partnership, corporation, or other 
legal entity owned or controlled by Indians, 
or a majority of whose members are Indians; 
(8) "Indian tribe" means any Indian tribe, 
band, nation, or other organized group or 
community of Indians recognized as eligible 
for the services provided to Indians by the 
Secretary because of their status as Indians, 
including any Alaska Native village as defined 
in section 1602(c) of title 43; 
(9) "parent" means any biological parent or 
parents of an Indian child or any Indian 
person who has lawfully adopted an Indian 
child, including adoptions under tribal law or 
custom. It does not include the unwed father 
where paternity has not been acknowledged 
or established; 
(10) "reservation" means Indian country as 
defined in section 1151 of title 18 and any 
lands, not covered under such section, title to 
which is either held by the United States in 
trust for the benefit of any Indian tribe or in-
dividual or held by any Indian tribe or indi-
vidual subject to a restriction by the United 
States against alienation; 
(11) "Secretary" means the Secretary of the 
Interior; and 
(12) "tribal court" means a court with juris-
diction over child custody proceedings and 
which is either a Court of Indian Offenses, a 
court established and operated under the 
code or custom of an Indian tribe, or any 
other administrative body of a tribe which is 
vested with authority over child custody pro-
ceedings. 
(Pub. L. 95-608. § 4. Nov. 8, 1978, 92 Stat. 3069.) 
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS 
This section is referred to in section 1727 of this 
title. 
S U B C H A P T E R I - C H I L D C U S T O D Y 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
§ 1911. Indian tribe jurisdiction over Indian child cus-
tody proceedings 
(a) Exclusive jurisdiction 
An Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction exclu-
sive as to any State over any child custody pro-
ceeding involving an Indian child who resides 
or is domiciled within the reservation of such 
tribe, except where such jurisdiction is other-
wise vested in the State by existing Federal law. 
Where an Indian child is a ward of a tribal 
court, the Indian tribe shall retain exclusive ju-
risdiction, notwithstanding the residence or do-
micile of the child. 
(b) Transfer of proceedings; declination by tribal 
court 
In any State court proceeding for the foster 
care placement of, or termination of parental 
rights to, an Indian child not domiciled or resid-
ing within the reservation of the Indian child's 
tribe, the court, in the absence of good cause to 
the contrary, shall transfer such proceeding to 
the jurisdiction of the tribe, absent objection 
"by either parent, upon the petition of either 
parent or the Indian custodian or the Indian 
child's tribe: Provided, That such transfer shall 
be subject to declination by the tribal court of 
such tribe. 
(c) State court proceedings; intervention 
In any State court proceeding for the foster 
care placement of, or termination of parental 
rights to, an Indian child, the Indian custodian 
of the child and the Indian child's tribe shall 
have a right to intervene at any point in the 
proceeding. 
(d) Full faith and credit to public acts, records, and 
judicial proceedings of Indian tribes 
The United States, every State, every terri-
tory or possession of the United States, and 
every Indian tribe shall give full faith and 
credit to the public acts, records, and judicial 
proceedings of any Indian tribe applicable to 
Indian child custody proceedings to the same 
extent that such entities give full faith and 
credit to the public acts, records, and judicial 
proceedings of any other entity. 
(Pub. L. 95-608, title I. § 101. Nov. 8. 1978, 92 
Stat. 3071.) 
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHE* SECTIONS 
This section is referred to in sections 1914. 1918. 
1923 of this title. 
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6 1912 TITLE 25- INDIANS 
§ 1912. Pending court proceedings 
fa) Notice; time for commencement of proceedings; 
additional time for preparation 
In any involuntary proceeding in a State 
court, where the court knows or has reason to 
know that an Indian child is involved, the party 
seeking the foster care placement of, or termi-
nation of parental rights to, an Indian child 
shall notify the parent or Indian custodian and 
the Indian child's tribe, by registered mail with 
return receipt requested, of the pending pro-
ceedings and of their right of intervention. If 
the identity or location of the parent or Indian 
custodian and the tribe cannot be determined, 
such notice shall be given to the Secretary in 
like manner, who shall have fifteen days after 
receipt to provide the requisite notice to the 
parent or Indian custodian and the tribe. No 
foster care placement or termination of paren-
tal rights proceeding shall be held until at least 
ten days after receipt of notice by the parent or 
Indian custodian and the tribe or the Secretary: 
Provided, That the parent or Indian custodian 
or the tribe shall, upon request, be granted up 
to twenty additional days to prepare for such 
proceeding. 
(b) Appointment of counsel 
In any case in which the court determines in-
digency, the parent or Indian custodian shall 
have the right to court-appointed counsel in 
any removal, placement, or termination pro-
ceeding. The court may, in its discretion, ap-
point counsel for the child upon a finding that 
such appointment is in the best interest of the 
child. Where State law makes no provision for 
appointment of counsel in such proceedings, 
the court shall promptly notify the Secretary 
upon appointment of counsel, and the Secre-
tary, upon certification of the presiding judge, 
shall pay reasonable fees and expenses out of 
funds which may be appropriated pursuant to 
section 13 of this title. 
(c) Examination of reports or other documentt 
Each party to a foster care placement or ter-
mination of parental rights proceeding under 
State law involving an Indian child shall have 
the right to examine all reports or other docu-
ments filed with the court upon which any de-
cision with respect to such action may be based. 
(d) Remedial services and rehabilitative programs; 
preventive measures 
Any party seeking to effect a foster care 
placement of, or termination of parental rights 
to, an Indian child under State law shall satisfy 
the court that active efforts have been made to 
provide remedial services and rehabilitative 
programs designed to prevent the breakup of 
the Indian family and that these efforts have 
proved unsuccessful. 
(e) Foster care placement orders; evidence; determi-
nation of damage to child 
No foster care placement may be ordered in 
such proceeding in the absence of a determina-
tion, supported by clear and convincing evi-
dence, including testimony of qualified expert 
witnesses, that the continued custody of the 
child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely 
to result in serious emotional or physical 
damage to the child. 
(f) Parental rights termination orders; evidence; de-
termination of damage to child 
No termination of parental rights may be or-
dered in such proceeding in the absence of a de-
termination, supported by evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt, including testimony of quali-
fied expert witnesses, that the continued custo-
dy of the child by the parent or Indian custodi-
an is likely to result in serious emotional or 
physical damage to the child. 
(Pub. L. 95-608, title I. § 102, Nov. 8, 1978, 92 
Stat. 3071.) 
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHEK SECTIONS 
This section is referred to in sections 1914, 1916 of 
this title. 
§ 1913. Parental rights, voluntary termination 
(a) Convent; record; certification matters; invalid con-
sents 
Where any parent or Indian custodian volun-
tarily consents to a foster care placement or to 
termination of parental rights, such consent 
shall not be valid unless executed in writing 
and recorded before a judge of a court of com-
petent jurisdiction and accompanied by the pre-
siding judge's certificate that the terms and 
consequences of the consent were fully ex-
plained in detail and were fully understood by 
the parent or Indian custodian. The court shall 
also certify that either the parent or Indian 
custodian fully understood the explanation in 
English or that it was interpreted into a lan-
guage that the parent or Indian custodian un-
derstood. Any consent given prior to, or within 
ten days after, birth of the Indian child shall 
not be valid. 
(b) Foster care placement; withdrawal of consent 
Any parent or Indian custodian may with-
draw consent to a foster care placement under 
State law at any time and, upon such withdraw-
al, the child shall be returned to the parent or 
Indian custodian. 
(c) Voluntary termination of parental rights or adop-
tive placement; withdrawal of consent; return of 
custody 
In any voluntary proceeding for termination 
of parental rights to. or adoptive placement of, 
an Indian child, the consent of the parent may 
be withdrawn for any reason at any time prior 
to the entry of a final decree of termination or 
adoption, as the case may be, and the child 
shall be returned to the parent.
 4 
(d) Collateral attack; vacation of decree and return of 
custody; limitations 
After the entry of a final decree of adoption 
of an Indian child in any State court, the 
parent may withdraw consent thereto upon the 
grounds that consent was obtained through 
fraud or duress and may petition the court to 
vacate such decree. Upon a finding that such 
consent was obtained through fraud or duress, 
the court shall vacate such decree and return 
the child to the parent. No adoption which has 
been effective for at least two years may be in-
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validated under the provisions of this subsec-
tion unless otherwise permitted under State 
law. 
(Pub. L. 95-608, title I. § 103, Nov. 8, 1978, 92 
Stat. 3072.) 
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SFCTIONS 
This section is referred to in section 1S14 of this 
title. 
§ 1914. Petition to court of competent jurisdiction to 
invalidate action upon shoeing of certain viola-
tions 
Any Indian child who is the subject of any 
action for foster care placement or termination 
of parental rights under State law, any parent 
or Indian custodian from whose custody such 
child was removed, and the Indian child's tribe 
may petition any court of competent jurisdic-
tion to invalidate such action upon a showing 
that such action violated any provision of sec-
tions 1911. 1912, and 1913 of this title. 
(Pub. L. 95-608. title I, § 104, Nov. 8, 1978, 92 
Stat. 3072.) 
§ 1915. Placement of Indian children 
(a) Adoptive placements; preferences 
In any adoptive placement of an Indian child 
under State law, a preference shall be given, in 
the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a 
placement with (1) a member of the child's ex-
tended family; (2) other members of the Indian 
child's tribe; or (3) other Indian families. 
(b) Foster care or preadoptive placements; criteria; 
preference! 
Any child accepted for foster care or preadop-
tive placement shall be placed in the least re-
strictive setting which most approximates a 
family and in which his special needs, if any, 
may be met. The child shall also be placed 
within reasonable proximity to his or her 
home, taking into account any special needs of 
the child. In any foster care or preadoptive 
placement, a preference shall be given, in the 
absence of good cause to the contrary, to a 
placement with— 
(i) a member of the Indian child's extended, 
family; 
(ii) a foster home licensed, approved, or 
specified by the Indian child's tribe; 
(iii) an Indian foster home licensed or ap-
proved by an authorized non-Indian licensing 
authority; or 
(iv) an institution for children approved by 
an Indian tribe or operated by an Indian or-
ganization which has a program suitable to 
meet the Indian child's needs. 
(c) Tribal resolution for different order of preference; 
personal preference considered; anonymity in ap-
plication of preferences 
In the case of a placement under subsection 
(a) or (b) of this section, if the Indian child's 
tribe shall establish a different order of prefer-
ence by resolution, the agency or court effect-
ing the placement shall follow such order so 
long as the placement is the least restrictive 
setting appropriate to the particular needs of 
the child, as provided in subsection (b) of this 
section. Where appropriate, the preference of 
the Indian child or parent shall be considered: 
Provided, That where a consenting parent evi-
dences a desire for anonymity, the court or 
agency shall give weight to such desire in ap-
plying the preferences. 
(d) Social and cultural standards applicable 
The standards to be applied in meeting the 
preference requirements of this section shall he 
the prevailing social and cultural standards of 
the Indian community in which the parent jr 
extended family resides or with which the 
parent or extended family members maintain 
social and cultural ties. 
(e) Record of placement; availability 
A record of each such placement, under State 
law, of an Indian child shall be maintained by 
the State in which the placement was made, 
evidencing the efforts to comply with the order 
of preference specified in this section. Such 
record shall be made available at any time upon 
the request of the Secretary or the Indian 
child's tribe. 
(Pub. L. 95-608, title I. § 105. Nov. 8, 1978, 92 
Stat. 3073.) 
§ 1916. Return of custody 
(a) Petition; best interests of child 
Notwithstanding State law to the contrary, 
whenever a final decree of adoption of an 
Indian child has been vacated or set aside or 
the adoptive parents voluntarily consent to the 
termination of their parental rights to the 
child, a biological parent or prior Indian custo-
dian may petition for return of custody and the 
court shall grant such petition unless there is a 
showing, in a proceeding subject to the provi-
sions of section 1912 of this title, that such 
return of custody is not in the best interests of 
the child. 
(b) Removal from foster care home; placement proce-
dure 
Whenever an Indian child is removed from a 
foster care home or institution for the purpose 
of further foster care, preadoptive. or adoptive 
placement, such placement shall be in accord-
ance with the provisions of this chapter, except 
in the case where an Indian child is being re-
turned to the parent or Indian custodian from 
whose custody the child was originally re-
moved 
(Pub. L. 95-608, title I, i 106. Nov. 8. 1978, 92 
Stat. 3073.) 
§ 1917. Tribal affiliation information and other infor-
mation for protection of rights from tribal rela-
tionship: application of subject of adoptive place-
ment; disclosure by court 
Upon application by an Indian individual who 
has reached the age of eighteen and who was 
the subject of an adoptive placement, the court 
which entered the final decree shall inform 
such individual of the tribal affiliation, if any. 
of the individual's biological parents and pro-
vide such other information as may be neces-
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sary to protect any rights flowing from the in-
dividual's tribal relationship. 
(Pub. L. 95-608. title 1, § 107. Nov. 8. 1978. 92 
Stat. 3073.) 
§ 1918. Reassumption of jurisdiction over child custo-
d> procerdings 
(a) Petition: suitable plan; approval by Secretary 
Any Indian tribe which became subject to 
State jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of 
the Act of August 15, 1953 (67 Stat. 588), as 
amended by title IV of the Act of April 11, 1368 
(82 Stat. 73, 78), or pursuant to any other Fed-
eral law, may rcassume jurisdiction over child 
custody proceedings. Before any Indian tribe 
may reassume jurisdiction over Indian child 
custody proceedings, such tribe shall present to 
the Secretary for approval a petition to reas-
sume such jurisdiction which includes a suit-
able plan to exercise such jurisdiction. 
(b) Criteria applicable to consideration by Secretary; 
partial retrocession 
(1) In considering the petition and feasibility 
of the plan of a tribe under subsection (a) of 
this section, the Secretary may consider, among 
other things: 
(i) whether or not the tribe maintains a 
membership roll or alternative provision for 
clearly identifying the persons who will be af-
fected by the reassumption of jurisdiction by 
the tribe; 
. (ii) the size of the reservation or former res-
ervation area which will be affected by retro-
cession and reassumption of jurisdiction by 
the tribe; 
(iii) the population base of the tribe, or dis-
tribution of the population in homogeneous 
communities or geographic areas; and 
(iv) the feasibility of the plan in cases of 
multitribal occupation of a single reservation 
or geographic area. 
(2) In those cases where the Secretary deter-
mines that the jurisdictional provisions of sec-
tion 1911(a) of this title are not feasible, he is 
authorized to accept partial retrocession which 
will enable tribes to exercise referral jurisdic-
tion as provided in section 1911(b) of this title, 
or. where appropriate, will allow them to exer-
cise exclusive jurisdiction as provided in section 
1911(a) of this title over limited community or 
geographic areas without regard for the reser-
vation status of the area affected. 
(c) Approval of petition; publication in Federal Regis-
ter, notice; reassumption period; correction of 
causes for disapproval 
If the Secretary approves any petition under 
subsection (a) of this section, the Secretary 
shall publish notice of such approval in the 
Federal Register and shall notify the affected 
State or States of such approval. The Indian 
tribe concerned shall reassume jurisdiction 
sixty days after publication in the Federal Reg-
ister of notice of approval. If the Secretary dis-
approves any petition under subsection (a) of 
this section, the Secretary shall provide such 
technical assistance as may be necessary to 
enable the tribe to correct any deficiency which 
the Secretary identified as a cause for disap-
proval. 
A-46 
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(d) rending actions or proceedings unaffected 
Assumption of jurisdiction under this section 
shall not affect any action or proceeding over 
which a court has already assumed jurisdiction, 
except as may be provided pursuant to any 
agreement under section 1919 of this title. 
(Pub. L. 95-608, title I. § 108. Nov. 8, 1978. 92 
Stat. 3074.) 
RLFLPENCES IN TEXT 
The Act of Aug. 15. 1953. referred to in s'jbsec. (a), is 
act Aug. 15. 1953. ch. 505. 67 Slat. 538, as amended, 
which t-nacttd section 1162 of Title 18, Crimes and 
Criminal Procedure, section 1360 of Title 28. Judiciary 
and Judicial Procedure, and provisions set out as notes 
under section 1360 of Title 28. For complete classifica-
tion of this Act to the Code, see Tables. 
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS 
This section is referred to in sections 1727. 1923 of 
this litle. 
§ 1919. Agreements between States and Indian tribes 
(a) Subject coverage 
States and Indian tribes are authorized to 
enter into agreements with each other respect-
ing care and custody of Indian children and ju-
risdiction over child custody proceedings, in-
cluding agreements which may provide for or-
derly transfer of jurisdiction on a case-by-case 
basis and agreements which provide for concur-
rent jurisdiction between States and Indian 
tribes. 
(b) Revocation; notice; actions or proceedings unaf-
fected 
Such agreements may be revoked by either 
party upon one hundred and eighty days* writ-
ten notice to the other party. Such revocation 
shall not affect any action or proceeding over 
which a court has already assumed jurisdiction, 
unless the agreement provides otherwise. 
(Pub. L. 95-608. title I. § 109, Nov. 8, 1978, 92 
Stat. 3074.) 
SECTION Rtrtfjua TO IN OTHER SECTIONS 
This section is referred to in sections 1918, 1923 of 
this title. 
§ 1920. Improper removal of child from custody; dec-
lination of jurisdiction; forthwith return of child: 
danger exception * 
Where any petitioner In an Indian child cus-
tody proceeding before a State court has Im-
properly removed the child from custody of the 
parent or Indian custodian or has improperly 
retained custody after a visit or other tempo-
rary relinquishment of custody, the court shall 
decline jurisdiction over such petition and shall 
forthwith return the 'child to his parent or 
Indian custodian unless returning the child to 
his parent or custodian would subject the child 
to a substantial and immediate danger or 
threat of such danger. 
(Pub. L. 95-608, title I. § 110. Nov. 8, 1978, 92 
SUL 3075.) 
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§ 191M. Higher State or Federal standard applicable to 
protect rights of parent or Indian custodian of 
Indian child 
In any case where State or Federal law appli-
cable to a child custody proceeding under State 
or Federal law provides a higher standard of 
protection to the rights of the parent or Indian 
custodian of an Indian child than the rights 
provided under this subchapter, the State or 
Federal court shall apply the State or Federal 
standard. 
(Pub. L. 95-608, title I, § 111, Nov. 8, 1978. 92 
Stat. 3075.) 
§ 1^ 22. Emergency removal or placement of child; ter-
mination; appropriate action 
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed 
to prevent the emergency removal of an Indian 
child who is a resident of or is domiciled on a 
reservation, but temporarily located off the res-
ervation, from his parent or Indian custodian 
or the emergency placement of such child in a 
foster home or institution, under applicable 
State Jaw, in order to prevent imminent physi-
cal damage or harm to the child. The State au-
thority, official, or agency involved shall insure 
that the emergency removal or placement ter-
minates immediately when such removal or 
placement is no longer necessary to prevent im-
minent physical damage or harm to the child 
and shall expeditiously initiate a child custody 
proceeding subject to the provisions of this sub-
chapter, transfer the child to the jurisdiction of 
the appropriate Indian tribe, or restore the 
child to the parent or Indian custodian, as may 
be appropriate. 
(Pub. L. 95-608. title I. § 112. Nov. 8, 1978, 92 
Stat. 3075.) 
§1923, Effective date 
None of the provisions of this subchapter, 
except sections 1911(a). 1918. and 1919 of this 
title, shall affect a proceeding under State law 
for foster care placement, termination of paren-
tal rights, preadoptive placement, or adoptive 
Placement which was initiated or completed 
prior to one hundred and eighty days after No-
vember 8, 1978, but shall apply to any subse-
quent proceeding in the same matter or subse-
quent proceedings affecting the custody or 
Placement of the same child. 
(Pub. L. 95-608. title I. 1113. Nov. 8. 1978, 92 
Stat. 3075.) 
SUBCHAPTER I I - I N D I A N CHILD AND 
FAMILY PROGRAMS 
91931. Grants for on or near reservation program! 
and child welfare codes 
(a) Statement of purpose; scope of program* 
The Secretary is authorized to make grants to 
Indian tribes and organizations in the establish-
ment and operation of Indian child and family 
service programs on or near reservations and in 
the preparation and implementation of child 
welfare codes. The objective of every Indian 
child and family service program shall be to 
Prevent the breakup of Indian families and. in 
particular, to insure that the permanent remov-
al of an Indian child from the custody of his 
parent or Indian custodian shall be a last 
resort. Such child and family sen ice programs 
may include, but are not limited to— 
(1) a system for licensing or otherwise regu-
lating Indian foster and adoptive homes; 
(2) the operation and maintenance of facili-
ties for the counseling and treatment of 
Indian families and for the temporary custo-
dy of Indian children; 
(3) family assistance, including homemaker 
and home counselors, day care, afterschool 
care, and employment, recreational activities, 
and respite care; 
(4) home improvement programs; 
(5) the employment of professional and 
other trained personnel to assist the tribal 
court in the disposition of domestic relations 
and child welfare matters; 
(6) education and training of Indians, in-
cluding tribal court judges and staff, in skills 
relating to child and family assistance and 
service programs; 
(7) a subsidy program under which Indian 
adoptive children may be provided support 
comparable to that for which they would be 
eligible as foster children, taking into account 
the appropriate State standards of support 
for maintenance and medical needs; and 
(8) guidance, legal representation, and 
advice to Indian families involved in tribal, 
State, or Federal child custody proceedings. 
(b) Non-Federal matching funds for related Social Se-
curity or other Federal financial assistance pro-
grams; assistance for such programs unaffected; 
State licensing or approval for qualification for 
assistance under federally assisted program 
Funds appropriated for use by the Secretary 
in accordance with this section may be utilized 
as non-Federal matching share in connection 
with funds provided under titles IV-B and XX 
of the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. 620 et seq., 
1397 et seq.] or under any other Federal finan-
cial assistance programs which contribute to 
the purpose for which such funds are author-
ized to be appropriated for use under this chap-
ter. The provision or possibility of assistance 
under this chapter shall not be a basis for the 
denial or reduction of any assistance otherwise 
authorized under titles IV-B and XX of the 
Social Security Act or any other federally as-
sisted program. For purposes of qualifying for 
assistance under a federally assisted program, 
licensing or approval of foster or adoptive 
homes or institutions by an Indian tribe shall 
be deemed equivalent to licensing or approval 
by a State. 
(Pub. L. 95-608. title II, § 201. Nov. 8, 1978. 92 
Stat, 3075.) 
RlfEHENCTS III T.EXT 
The Social Security Act. referred to in subsec. (b), is 
act Aug. 14. 1935. ch. 531. 49 Stat 620. as amended. 
Title* IV-B and XX of the Social Security Act are 
classified generally to part B <|620 et seq.) of sub-
chapter IV and subchapter XX (f 13S7 et seq.) of chap-
ter 7 of Title 42. The Pubhc Health and Welfare. For 
complete classification of this Act to the Code, see sec-
tion 1305 of Title 42 and Tablet. 
332 
A-47 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
§1932 TITLE 25 -INDIANS 
§ 1932. Grants for off-re^enation programs for addi-
tional services 
The Secretary is also authorized to make 
grants to Indian organizations to establish and 
operate off-reservation Indian child and family 
service programs which may include, but are 
not limited to — 
(1) a system for regulating, 'maintaining, 
and supporting Indian foster and adoptive 
homes, including a subsidy program under 
which Indian adoptive children may be pro-
vided support comparable to that for which 
they would be eligible as Indian foster chil-
dren, taking into account the appropriate 
State standards of support for maintenance 
and medical needs; 
(2) the operation and maintenance of facili-
ties and services for counseling and treatment 
of Indian families and Indian foster and adop-
tive children; 
(3) family assistance, including homemaker 
and home counselors, day care, afterschool 
care, and employment, recreational activities, 
and respite care; and 
(4) guidance, legal representation, and 
advice to Indian families involved in child cus-
tody proceedings. 
(Pub. L. 95-608, title II. §202. Nov. 8. 1978. 92 
Stat. 3076.) 
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS 
This section is referred to in section 1934 of this 
title. 
§ 1933. Funds for on and off reservation programs 
(a) Appropriated funds for similar programs of De-
partment of Health and Human Services; appro-
priation in ad\ance for payments 
In the establishment, operation, and funding 
of Indian child and family service programs, 
both on and off reservation, the Secretary may 
enter into agreements with the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services, and the latter Sec-
retary is hereby authorized for such purposes 
to use funds appropriated for similar programs 
of the Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices: Provided, That authority to make pay-
ments pursuant to such agreements shall be ef-
fective only to the extent and in such amounts 
as may be provided in advance by appropriation 
Acts. 
(b) Appropriation authorization under section 13 of 
this title 
Funds for the purposes of this chapter may 
be appropriated pursuant to the provisions of 
section 13 of this title. 
(Pub. L. 95-608, title II. { 203, Nov. 8. 1978. 92 
Stat. 3076; Pub. L. 96-88. title V. § 509(b). Oct. 
17, 1979. 93 Stat. 695.) 
CHANGE or NAME 
"Secretary of Health and Human Services" and "De-
partment of Health and Human Services" were substi-
tuted for "Secretary of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare" and "Department of Health. Education, and 
Welfare", respectively, in subsec. (a) pursuant to sec-
tion 50S:b> of Pub. L. 96-88. which is classified to sec-
tion 3508(b) of Title 20. Education. 
SECTION REFFRRLD TO IN OTHEP SFCTIONS 
This section is referred to in action 1934 of this 
title. 
§ 1934. "Indian" defined for certain purposes 
For the purposes of sections 1932 and 1933 of 
this title, the term "Indian" shall include per-
sons defined in section K)03'c) of this title. 
(Pub. L. 95-608. title II. §204, Nov. 8, 1978. 92 
Slat. 3077.) 
SUBCHAPTKR III KKCOKIJKKKPING. IN-
FORMATION AVAILAHlU'i Y. AND TIME-
TABLES 
§ 1 **,>!. Information availability to and disclo>ure by 
Secretary 
(a> Copy of final decree or order; other information; 
anonymity affidavit; exemption from Freedom of 
Information Act 
Any State court entering a final decree or 
order in any Indian child adoptive placement 
after November 8. 1978, shall provide the Secre-
tary with a copy of such decree or order togeth-
er with such other information as may be nec-
essary to show— 
(1) the name and tribal affiliation of the 
child; 
(2) the names and addresses of the biologi-
cal parents; 
(3) the names and addresses of the adoptive 
parents; and 
(4) the identity of any agency having files 
or information relating to such adoptive 
placement. 
Where the court records contain an affidavit of 
the biological parent or parents that their iden-
tity remain confidential, the court shall include 
such affidavit with the other information. The 
Secretary shall insure that the confidentiality 
of such information is maintained and such in-
formation shall not be subject to the Freedom 
of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552), as amended. 
(b) Disclosure of information for enrollment of 
Indian child in tribe or for determination of 
member rights or benefits; certification of entitle-
ment to enrollment 
Upon the request of the adopted Indian child 
over the age of eighteen, the adoptive or foster 
parents of an Indian child, or an Indian tribei 
the Secretary shall disclose such information as 
may be necessary for the enrollment of an 
Indian child in the tribe in which the child may 
be eligible for enrollment or for determining 
any rights or benefits associated with that 
membership. Where the documents relating to 
such child contain an affidavit from the biologi-
cal parent or parents requesting anonymity, the 
Secretary shall certify to the Indian child's 
tribe, where the information warrants, that the 
child's parentage and other circumstances of 
birth entitle the child to enrollment under the 
criteria established by such tribe. 
(Pub. L. 95-608, title III. § 301. Nov. 8. 1978. 92 
StaU 3077.) 
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§ 1952. Rules and regulations 
Within one hundred and eighty days after 
November 8, 1978. t he Secretary shall promul-
gate such rules and regulations as may be nec-
essary to carry out the provisions of this chap-
ter. 
(Pub. L. 95-608, title III . §302. Nov. 8. 1978. 92 
Stat . 3077.) 
SUBCHAPTER IV -MISCELLANEOUS 
PROVISIONS 
§ 1961. Education; day schools; report to congression-
al committees: particular consideration of ele-
mentary grade facilities 
(a) It is t he sense of Congress that the ab-
sence of locally convenient day schools may 
contr ibute to the breakup of Indian families. 
(b) Omit ted 
(Pub. L. 95-608, t i t le IV, § 401. Nov. 8. 1978, 92 
Stat . 3078.) 
CODIFICATION 
Subsec. (b), which required the Secretary, in consul-
tation with agencies in the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare, to report on the feasibility of 
providing Indian children with schools located near 
their homes and to submit the report to specific com-
mittees of the House of Representatives and Senate 
within two years from Nov. 8, 1978. uas oinitted from 
the Code as executed. 
§ 1962. Omitted 
CoDiriCATiow 
Section. Pub. L 95-608. title IV. §402, Nov. 8. 1978, 
92 Stat. 3078. which provided that within sixty days 
after Nov. 8. 1978, the Secretary of the Interior send 
to the Governor, chief justice of the highest court of 
appeal, and the attorney general of each State a copy 
of this chapter, together with committee reports and 
an explanation of the provisions of this chapter, was 
omitted from the Code as executed. 
§ J963. Severability of provisions 
If any provision of this chapter or the appli-
cability thereof is held invalid, the remaining 
provisions of this chap te r shall not be affected 
thereby. 
<Pub. L. 95-608. title IV, §403. Nov. 8. 1978. 92 
Stat . 3078.) 
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